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POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
RELAXING THE DEAD HAND: 
CAN THE PEOPLE BE TRUSTED? 
TODD E. PETTYS∗ 
ABSTRACT 
A growing number of constitutional scholars are urging the nation to 
rethink its commitment to judicial supremacy. Popular constitutionalists 
argue that the American people, not the courts, hold the ultimate authority 
to interpret the Constitution’s many open-ended provisions whose 
meanings are reasonably contestable. This Article defends popular 
constitutionalism on two important fronts. First, using originalism as a 
paradigmatic example of the ways in which courts frequently draw 
constitutional meaning from sources deeply rooted in the past, the Article 
contends that defenders of judicial supremacy still have not persuasively 
responded to the familiar dead-hand query: Why should constitutional 
meanings that prevailed in the past be privileged over the meanings that a 
majority of Americans would assign to the Constitution’s text today? The 
Article considers five of the leading efforts to respond to that query and 
argues that each of them falls short of its objective. Second, the Article 
responds to the most fundamental criticism that has been leveled against 
popular constitutionalism—namely, that the American people cannot be 
trusted to preserve constitutionalism’s essential distinction between 
ordinary and fundamental law, and that citizens thus need to rely upon 
politically insulated judges to preserve that distinction for them. The 
Article identifies five reasons to believe that, if the ultimate power to 
interpret the Constitution’s open-ended provisions were shifted from the 
courts to the political domain, the American people would prove 
themselves able and willing to distinguish between their long-term 
fundamental commitments and their short-term political desires in the 
manner that constitutionalism demands. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For my part, I believe that the people and their Representatives, two 
or three centuries hence, will be as honest, as wise, as faithful to 
themselves, and will understand their rights as well, and be as able 
to defend them, as the people are at this period. The contrary 
supposition is absurd. 
—Noah Webster1 
Although Congress and the President occasionally have indicated that 
they do not feel obliged to accept the federal courts’ interpretations of the 
Constitution,2 it has been a long time since the United States’ commitment 
to judicial supremacy seemed genuinely in doubt. Citizens and politicians 
today usually appear content to accept the Supreme Court’s claim that “the 
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the 
Constitution.”3 Americans have focused their disagreements instead on 
how courts should arrive at the constitutional interpretations that will bind 
the country. While originalists stress the primacy of the text’s original 
meaning,4 for example, nonoriginalists try to identify ways in which 
judges can discover constitutional meanings beyond those in play at the 
time of the text’s ratification.5 
 
 
 1. Giles Hickory [Noah Webster], Government, 3 AM. MAG. 137, 140 (1788).  
 2. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a), (b) (2000) 
(expressly disapproving of the Supreme Court’s construction of the Free Exercise Clause in 
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and seeking to restore the construction advanced 
by the Court in an earlier era), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) 
(examining the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and holding that Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not authorize Congress to reject the Court’s determination of “what constitutes a 
constitutional violation”); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23–
25 (16th ed. 2007) (reviewing various presidents’ assertions of interpretive authority). 
 3. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); see NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 5 (2004) (stating that “newspapers and constitutional law texts typically 
treat Court interpretations of the Constitution as supreme”); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 2 (2007) (“At least in the United States, judicial 
supremacy is often regarded as essential to constitutionalism.”); Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. 
Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1637–39 (2005) (arguing that, 
although citizens sometimes disagree with the Supreme Court’s rulings, they widely accept judicial 
supremacy). 
 4. See infra note 18 (citing authorities that provide an overview of originalists’ methods). 
 5. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 15 (1996) (declaring his goal of reconciling judicial supremacy with democracy); id. at 
7–10 (outlining his theory of constitutional interpretation, under which judges work with other 
officials—past, present, and future—to construct “a coherent constitutional morality”); RICHARD H. 
FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 111 (2001) (stating that the courts can find 
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In recent years, however, a number of scholars—falling loosely under 
the banner of “popular constitutionalism”—have skeptically set their 
sights squarely on the Court’s claim that its constitutional interpretations 
bind the nation.6 Larry Kramer,7 Sanford Levinson,8 Mark Tushnet,9 
Adrian Vermeule,10 Jeremy Waldron,11 and others12 have argued that it is 
“the People,” and not federal judges, who hold the ultimate interpretive 
authority on disputed constitutional questions.13 Because sovereignty rests 
with the nation’s citizens, these scholars argue, it is ultimately the task of 
the citizenry—and not a politically unaccountable judicial elite—to 
interpret the nation’s fundamental law. 
In this Article, I defend popular constitutionalism on two important 
fronts. Both of my arguments build upon concerns regarding the 
democratic legitimacy of granting the judiciary the ultimate power to 
 
 
constitutional meaning in sources beyond the written Constitution, such as “judicial precedent and 
entrenched historical practice”); Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 
1759–60 (2007) (describing his “movement-party-presidency” theory of how the Constitution may be 
amended outside the confines of Article V); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, 
and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 947 (2006) (“Courts respond to social disruption by 
social movements . . . ; they reconstitute and reformulate law in the light of political contestation, 
rationally reconstructing and synthesizing changes in political norms with what has come before.”); 
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 373, 379 (2007) (describing a theory under which the courts retain ultimate interpretive 
authority, but take into consideration “popular values and ideals” when identifying constitutional 
meanings). 
 6. See Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose 
Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 723 (2006) (“All of the concrete legal 
proposals advanced by ‘popular constitutionalists’ seek to qualify judicial supremacy.”). 
 7. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW passim (2004). 
 8. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 46–50 (1988) (endorsing a “Protestant” 
conception of constitutional interpretation, in which supreme interpretive authority does not rest with 
the Court). Professor Levinson also has identified ways in which the ratified texts themselves establish 
undemocratic institutional arrangements. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT 
IT) passim (2006) [hereinafter LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION] (criticizing such 
things as life tenure for federal judges, the Electoral College, and the equal representation of the 
differently populated states in the Senate). 
 9. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS passim (1999). 
 10. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION passim (2006). 
 11. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT passim (1999). 
 12. See, e.g., NAOMI WOLF, THE END OF AMERICA 4–5 (2007) (arguing that ordinary citizens, 
rather than lawyers and government officials, are ultimately responsible for protecting citizens’ 
constitutional freedoms); Andrei Marmor, Are Constitutions Legitimate?, 20 CAN. J. L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 69, 86–92 (2007) (arguing that legislatures are better suited than courts to resolve 
disputed questions of values). 
 13. See generally Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the 
True Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J. 897, 898 (2005) (“‘[T]he People’ have become 
constitutional theory’s hottest fashion.”). 
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resolve disputes concerning the meaning of the many open-ended 
provisions of the Constitution that are reasonably susceptible to conflicting 
interpretations. First, I argue that defenders of judicial supremacy still 
have not offered a satisfying response to the familiar dead-hand objection 
that plagues many of the interpretive methods that courts ordinarily 
employ. Second, and most fundamentally, I argue that the American 
people can be trusted to preserve the distinction between ordinary and 
fundamental law that constitutionalism requires, and that the American 
people thus do not need to rely upon politically insulated judges to 
preserve that distinction for them. 
For those encountering popular constitutionalism for the first time, the 
claim that the American people are the supreme interpretive authority on 
disputed matters of constitutional law might seem like a difficult pill to 
swallow. As Mark Tushnet notes, some observers are terrified about what 
might happen if the courts were stripped of their interpretive supremacy.14 
Larry Alexander and Lawrence Solum, for example, respond to Larry 
Kramer’s version of popular constitutionalism with a shudder, stating that 
it has “the capacity to inspire dread and make the blood run cold.”15 
Indeed, it often seems as if we are hardwired to defer to the courts on 
questions of constitutional meaning. Surely, we tell ourselves, the ultimate 
responsibility for interpreting the Constitution should rest with highly 
intelligent, law-savvy judges, and not with untrained, grubby-handed, 
ordinary Americans.16 Although our constitutional system draws its 
legitimacy from “the consent of the governed,”17 we are disinclined to 
allow the governed themselves to play the leading role in determining 
what the Constitution means. So long as courts apply the appropriate 
methods of constitutional interpretation, this view suggests, we should 
accept judicial supremacy as a necessary feature of our constitutional 
system. 
 
 
 14. See TUSHNET, supra note 9, at 124, 177. 
 15. Alexander & Solum, supra note 3, at 1594. 
 16. Max Lerner captured the sentiment nearly three-quarters of a century ago: 
We have somehow managed in our minds to place the judges above the battle. Despite every 
proof to the contrary, we have persisted in attributing to them the objectivity and infallibility 
that are ultimately attributes only of godhead. The tradition persists that they . . . sit in their 
robes like the haughty gods of Lucretius, high above the plains on which human beings 
swarm, unaffected by the preferences and prejudices that move common men. 
Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1311 (1937). 
 17. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that . . . Governments . . . derive[] their just powers from the consent of the governed 
. . . .”); see also U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and establish 
this Constitution for the United States of America.”). 
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Consider, for example, originalism’s continued prominence as a 
method of constitutional interpretation, notwithstanding the attacks 
consistently leveled against it.18 Originalist methods owe their widespread 
use, at least in part,19 to the apparent appeal of two fundamental claims, 
both of which are aimed at alleviating concerns about the democratic 
legitimacy of allowing unelected judges to bind the nation with their 
interpretations of the Constitution. First, originalists contend that their 
interpretive methods offer the greatest promise of preventing judges from 
imposing their personal preferences on the rest of society.20 Second, they 
argue that the courts’ primary task when interpreting the Constitution is to 
ensure that government officials obey the supreme will of the sovereign 
people as expressed in the Constitution’s text—a task that originalists 
contend can be accomplished only if courts enforce the Constitution’s 
original, ratified meaning.21 The resulting formulation draws a tight 
 
 
 18. See FALLON, supra note 5, at 3 (identifying originalism as a leading theory of constitutional 
interpretation); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613 
(1999) (arguing that originalism is the reigning theory of constitutional interpretation); Jonathan R. 
Macey, Originalism as an “ism”, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 301 (1996) (positing that 
originalism is far more widely accepted than commonly believed). The precise contours of originalism 
continue to evolve. See George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 330–33 (1995) 
(describing many originalists’ shift in focus from original intentions to original meaning); Keith E. 
Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599–613 (2004) (describing the 
evolution of originalist theory over the past forty years). 
 19. Scholars offer a variety of additional explanations for originalism’s continued prominence. 
See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 367 (1996) (arguing that appeals to original meaning remain common because “the 
Revolutionary era provides Americans with the one set of consensual political symbols that come 
closest to universal acceptance”); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The 
Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 549 (2006) (attributing originalism’s 
prominence to its usefulness in driving a conservative political agenda); David A. Strauss, Common 
Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879 (1996) (arguing that originalism and 
textualism “owe their preeminence not to their plausibility but to the lack of a coherently formulated 
competitor”). 
 20. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
155 (1990) (arguing that originalism is the only “method of constitutional adjudication [that] can 
confine courts to a defined sphere of authority and thus prevent them from assuming powers whose 
exercise alters, perhaps radically, the design of the American Republic”); Barry Friedman & Scott B. 
Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 27 (1998) (stating that nonoriginalist 
theories have been criticized for “appear[ing] to give unelected judges free rein with the country’s 
fundamental charter”); John Harrison, Forms of Originalism and the Study of History, 26 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 83, 83 (2003) (stating that originalists in the 1970s “found it impossible to explain what 
judges had been doing for the preceding twenty or thirty years unless the judges had been making 
choices that reflected their own views of desirable results and not general, impersonal legal 
principles”); Whittington, supra note 18, at 602 (stating that many of originalism’s proponents have 
argued that originalism “prevent[s] judges from acting as legislators and substituting their own 
substantive political preferences and values for those of the people and their elected representatives”). 
 21. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 153–56 (1999) (linking originalism, judicial supremacy, and 
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connection between originalism and judicial supremacy: The American 
people have expressed their fundamental commitments in the Constitution, 
and it is ultimately the job of politically insulated judges to make sure 
those commitments are honored.22 
For many years, however, critics of that formulation have questioned 
originalism’s ability to deliver the democratic legitimacy that its 
proponents promise. Many scholars have argued, for example, that 
originalism rarely constrains judges who are tempted to decide cases based 
on their personal preferences.23 Even if originalism did meaningfully 
constrain judges, it creates a legitimacy problem of a different sort, 
reflected in the familiar dead-hand query: Why should people alive today 
be bound by the values and understandings of generations long dead?24 
 
 
the textually expressed will of the sovereign people); Paul W. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of 
American Constitutionalism, 98 YALE L.J. 449, 506 (1989) (“Th[e] act of popular sovereignty 
provides the political legitimacy for the interpretive methodology of the originalist.”); Kurt T. Lash, 
Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1440 (2007) 
(stating that the most common normative justification for originalism is “popular sovereignty and the 
judicially enforced will of the people”); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 849, 862 (1989) (“The purpose of constitutional guarantees . . . is precisely to prevent the law 
from reflecting certain changes in original values that the society adopting the Constitution thinks 
fundamentally undesirable.”). 
 22. Robert Bork, who helped spur originalism to its current prominence, offers precisely that 
formulation when he argues that, if originalism were fatally flawed, “there would remain only one 
democratically legitimate solution: judicial supremacy, the power of courts to invalidate statutes and 
executive actions in the name of the Constitution, would have to be abandoned.” BORK, supra note 20, 
at 160. But see Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 983 (1987) 
(asserting, as an originalist, that the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Constitution do “not 
establish a supreme law of the land that is binding on all persons and parts of government henceforth 
and forevermore”). 
 23. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 18, at 304 (arguing that “originalism is not nearly so determinate 
as its most vocal proponents would suggest” and that “willful judges will be able to use this 
indeterminacy to justify whatever results they want on originalist grounds”); Post & Siegel, supra note 
19, at 557–65 (arguing that originalists only apply their declared methods of interpretation when it 
leads to outcomes they desire); Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the Originalism Debate, 15 
CONST. COMMENT. 411, 433 (1998) (stating that originalist methods often yield principles framed at 
such a high level of generality that they are “useless in hard cases for anything other than symbolic 
purposes”); cf. Scalia, supra note 21, at 856 (conceding that “it is often exceedingly difficult to plumb 
the original understanding of an ancient text”). 
 24. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 11 
(1980) (arguing that originalists’ claim to be democratically abiding by the will of the people “is 
largely a fake,” since the people who wrote and ratified the constitutional language “have been dead 
for a century or two”); Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 382 (1997) 
[hereinafter Klarman, Antifidelity] (asserting that it is “antidemocratic for a contemporary majority to 
be governed by values enshrined in the Constitution over two hundred years ago”); Michael J. 
Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 
VA. L. REV. 1881, 1915 (1995) [hereinafter, Klarman, Brown, Originalism and Constitutional Theory] 
(“No originalist thinker of whom I am aware has convincingly explained why the present generation 
should be ruled from the grave.”); Michael S. Moore, The Dead Hand of Constitutional Tradition, 19 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 263, 263–73 (1996) (rejecting attempts to justify giving conclusive authority 
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What gave men in the late eighteenth century, who lived in a world vastly 
different from our own,25 the right to impose their preferences on all future 
generations of Americans, unless those later generations could meet the 
supermajority requirements that the founding generation prescribed for 
constitutional amendments in Article V?26 For those generations that do 
manage to amend the Constitution, what gives them the right to bind 
future majorities until a supermajority can again be assembled? 
Nonoriginalist proponents of judicial supremacy must confront 
legitimacy challenges of their own. As Andrei Marmor points out, “the 
more flexible the culture of constitutional interpretation is taken to be, the 
more power it grants to the courts in determining its content,” and thus 
“the more reason you have to worry about the anti-democratic role of the 
courts in determining matters of moral [and] political importance in the 
constitutional domain.”27 Moreover, many of the sources of constitutional 
meaning that nonoriginalists identify—such as tradition and prior 
generations’ social movements28—are themselves largely imposed on the 
present generation by the dead hand of the past.29 Faced with that reality, 
one might conclude that the only way to ensure that Americans today are 
truly self-governed is to abandon judicial supremacy altogether—which is 
precisely what popular constitutionalists urge us to do. 
Popular constitutionalists do not try to escape the reach of the dead 
hand entirely. None of these scholars contend, for example, that the nation 
can simply disregard the Constitution’s unambiguous requirements, such 
as those concerning the age one must be to serve as a Senator, the length 
of a Representative’s term, the congressional supermajority needed to 
override a presidential veto, and so forth.30 Popular constitutionalists 
 
 
to original meanings and the traditions that have emerged out of them). See generally Adam M. 
Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606 (2008). 
 25. See Klarman, Antifidelity, supra note 24, at 384–87 (emphasizing the differences between the 
founders’ world and the modern era). 
 26. See U.S. CONST. art. V (describing several means by which the Constitution may be 
amended, all of which require multiple supermajorities). 
 27. Marmor, supra note 12, at 76–77. 
 28. See supra note 5 (citing authorities that endorse the use of such sources). 
 29. Cf. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 
NW. U. L. REV. 383, 392 (2007) (“[I]f the dead hand objection is really right, why should we ever pay 
attention to the constitutional text, formulated long ago, regardless of whether it is to be given its 
original meaning? That text is as much a product of the past as the meaning a past generation 
understood it to convey.”). 
 30. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 9, at 9–11, 24 (distinguishing between the “thick” 
Constitution (those parts that establish the federal government’s basic structures) and the “thin” 
Constitution (those parts that concern individual rights) and focusing his arguments against judicial 
supremacy on the latter); VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 230 (“Judges should . . . defer to legislatures on 
the interpretation of constitutional texts that are ambiguous, can be read at multiple levels of 
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appear content to presume that if a constitutional provision is not 
reasonably susceptible to competing interpretations, then the nation should 
deem itself bound by that provision’s plain meaning.31 But with respect to 
the open-ended provisions whose meanings are reasonably contestable 
(such as the frequently litigated provisions of the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment), popular constitutionalists insist that “the 
People,” and not the courts, have the ultimate authority to determine what 
those provisions demand.32 
The prospect of popular constitutionalism raises provocative issues. 
One of those issues is largely practical in nature: By what means are the 
American people expected to exercise their interpretive power? Should the 
power be exercised by citizens’ elected representatives and manifested in 
the legislation that those representatives enact? Should it be exercised by 
citizens themselves through direct-democracy mechanisms, such as 
referendums and initiatives? Is there some other, less formalized way in 
which citizens should make their interpretations clear? As one scholar has 
noted, popular constitutionalists have said very little “about what their 
theories demand from individual citizens in order to operate effectively.”33 
These are vitally important matters on which popular constitutionalists 
owe their critics a persuasive response.34 
In this Article, I focus on two even more fundamental concerns, both of 
which must be addressed if a proposal for popular interpretive 
mechanisms is to be anything other than a hollow academic exercise. First, 
does judicial supremacy actually suffer from the kinds of democratic 
deficits that popular constitutionalists perceive? If judicial supremacy is 
more easily reconciled with democratic values than its critics allege, then 
 
 
generality, or embody aspirational norms whose content changes over time with shifting public 
values.”). Cf. BORK, supra note 20, at 170 (noting that scholars who raise the dead-hand objection 
against originalism are usually focusing only on “those amendments to the Constitution that guarantee 
individual rights,” and not the provisions establishing the federal government’s basic policymaking 
processes); DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 11 (stating that, in many constitutional cases, “[t]he ordinary 
craft of a judge dictates an answer and leaves no room for the play of personal moral conviction”). 
 31. See infra text accompanying notes 78–80 in which I posit an explanation for this limited 
acceptance of the dead hand’s grasp.  
 32. This theme of popular constitutionalism strongly resembles James Thayer’s contention that 
the courts must defer to the political branches’ constitutional interpretations unless those 
interpretations as so clearly mistaken that the matter “is not open to rational question.” James B. 
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 
144 (1893). 
 33. Gewirtzman, supra note 13, at 910. 
 34. See infra notes 128–30 (noting a few scholarly discussions of these practical concerns); cf. 
KRAMER, supra note 7, at 207 (stating that advocates of judicial supremacy have historically benefited 
from ordinary citizens’ “uncertainty over the means through which [their constitutional interpretations 
are to be] expressed”). 
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perhaps we should leave well enough alone. Second, and most 
fundamentally, can political majorities be trusted to self-enforce the limits 
that the Constitution purports to place upon them? Parts I and II focus on 
those concerns, respectively. 
In Part I, using originalism as a paradigmatic example of a judicial 
method of interpretation that draws upon constitutional meanings forged 
long ago, I argue that defenders of judicial supremacy still have not 
satisfactorily responded to the dead-hand objection. I hasten to emphasize 
at the outset that the problem is not unique to originalism. The judicial 
supremacist must confront the dead-hand problem even if he or she prefers 
to pull constitutional meaning from tradition, prior generations’ social 
movements, or some other nonoriginalist source that draws its purported 
authority from the past.35 I focus on originalism simply because it presents 
the dead-hand problem in a classic, readily appreciable form, because 
originalist modes of interpretation remain so frequently used by the courts, 
and because originalists have argued so strenuously that their interpretive 
methods offer the best hope of reconciling judicial supremacy with 
democratic values. I consider five leading efforts to explain why it is 
democratically legitimate for courts to apply the original meaning of an 
open-ended constitutional provision in cases in which the original meaning 
conflicts with the meaning that a majority of Americans would assign 
today. I argue that all of those explanatory efforts fall short of their 
objective. 
In Part II, I respond to what is perhaps the most serious attack on 
popular constitutionalism. Regardless of how the American people are to 
exercise their interpretive power, in what sense is popular 
constitutionalism genuinely a form of constitutionalism if the 
Constitution’s open-ended provisions mean whatever a majority of the 
people or their representatives say they mean?36 The very notion of 
constitutionalism entails a distinction between ordinary and fundamental 
law, with the latter constraining the former.37 Following Chief Justice John 
 
 
 35. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting the existence of nonoriginalist yet past-
focused modes of interpretation). 
 36. See Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1127, 1127 (1998) (stating that “the dead hand argument, if accepted, is fatal to any form of 
constitutionalism”); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 29, at 392 (cautioning that one should not take 
the dead-hand argument too far, because doing so would lead to allowing present-day majorities to do 
anything they like, in violation of a fundamental premise of constitutionalism). 
 37. See KRAMER, supra note 7, at 29–31, 45–46 (stating that the founding generation honored a 
distinction between fundamental law, which is created by the people in order to constrain government, 
and ordinary law, which is created by government in order to regulate the people in compliance with 
the people’s fundamental law). 
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Marshall’s lead in Marbury v. Madison more than two centuries ago,38 this 
nation has long presumed that the chief purpose of the Constitution—
beyond establishing the federal government’s basic institutions and 
procedural ground rules—is to place constraints on what political 
majorities can do when creating and enforcing statutes, regulations, and 
other forms of ordinary law.39 If the power to interpret the Constitution 
ultimately rests with political majorities, rather than with a politically 
insulated judiciary, are not the American people then unconstrained in 
precisely the areas where we want the Constitution to constrain them?40 
Believing that a popularly interpreted constitution is not really a 
constitution at all, critics have charged that what popular constitutionalists 
 
 
 38. Chief Justice Marshall wrote: 
To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to 
writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The 
distinction, between a government with limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those 
limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts 
allowed, are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the 
constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the 
constitution by an ordinary act.  
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a superior, 
paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative 
acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. 
5 U.S. 137, 176–77 (1803). 
 39. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very purpose of a 
Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place 
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied 
by the courts.”); RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW 
POLITICAL DEBATE 135 (2006) (“The American Constitution limits the power of political majorities by 
recognizing individual constitutional rights that majorities may not infringe.”); Friedman & Smith, 
supra note 20, at 58 (“This is the single most important function of a constitution—to limit present 
preferences in light of deeper commitments.”); Marmor, supra note 12, at 70 (stating that the primary 
purpose of a written constitution “is to remove certain important moral/political decisions from the 
ordinary business of lawmaking”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our 
Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703, 786 (2002) (stating that, when considering the 
means by which the Constitution may be amended, it “is necessary to ensure that the Constitution 
actually limits majorities”). 
 40. See James E. Fleming, Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy: Taking the Constitution 
Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1377, 1390 (2005) (stating that “it is not clear that 
the Constitution, or constitutionalism, is doing much work in popular constitutionalism”). Michael 
McConnell makes a comparable point in his criticism of nonoriginalist modes of interpreting the 
Constitution: 
If the Constitution is authoritative only to the extent that it accords with our independent 
judgments about political morality and structure, then the Constitution itself is only a 
makeweight: what gives force to our conclusions is simply our beliefs about what is good, 
just, and efficient. Taken to its logical conclusion, this line of argument does not provide a 
reason for treating the Constitution as authoritative; it instructs us to disregard the 
Constitution whenever we disagree with it. 
McConnell, supra note 36, at 1129. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
324 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:313 
 
 
 
 
are endorsing is nothing short of mob rule.41 I argue that the people’s 
capacity for self-restraint is greater than critics of popular 
constitutionalism have imagined, and is sufficient to maintain the 
distinction between ordinary and fundamental law that constitutionalism 
demands. 
I. ORIGINALISM AND THE DEAD-HAND PROBLEM 
A. Odysseus and the Sirens 
When considering the ways in which a written constitution might 
legitimately bind a citizenry, Jon Elster proposes an analogy to the 
measures that Odysseus took in his effort to avoid the Sirens in Homer’s 
The Odyssey.42 Circe warns Odysseus that he and his men will soon be 
sailing by the Sirens’ island, that the Sirens will try to lure Odysseus 
ashore with their beautiful singing, and that Odysseus must resist the 
temptation because all who succumb to it die.43 Following Circe’s 
instructions, Odysseus orders his men to bind him to the ship’s mast, to fill 
their own ears with beeswax, and to resist any pleading gestures he might 
make while enthralled by the Sirens’ voices.44 When Odysseus hears the 
Sirens, he motions at his men to free him, but they only bind him more 
tightly and continue sailing until they and their leader are out of danger.45 
Similarly, Elster suggests, if a democratic society believed it might 
sometimes fall “under the sway of irrational fears or demagoguery,” it 
could codify its fundamental “precommitments” in a constitution and then 
take the job of interpreting that constitution “out of the hands of those 
whom it is supposed to keep in line.”46 
If that analogy were persuasive, it would offer a way of 
conceptualizing judicially enforced constitutionalism without the dead-
 
 
 41. Alexander & Solum, supra note 3, at 1640 (arguing that “constitutional interpretation by mob 
. . . is the logical stopping point of” popular constitutionalism). 
 42. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY (Robert Fagles trans., Viking Penguin 1996) (n.d.); see JON ELSTER, 
SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS 195 (1989) [hereinafter ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS] (analogizing 
constitutional “precommitments” to Odysseus’ efforts to avoid the Sirens); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND 
THE SIRENS passim (1979, rev. ed. 1984) (same); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 89–96 (2000) 
[hereinafter ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND] (same). Elster draws his inspiration for the analogy from 
Benedict de Spinoza, who used it to defend his claim that there are some laws that a monarch cannot 
abolish. See BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, Tractatus Politicus, in A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE AND 
A POLITICAL TREATISE 279, 327 (R.H.M. Elwes trans., Dover Publ’ns 1951) (1677). 
 43. HOMER, supra note 42, at 272–73. 
 44. Id. at 276–77. 
 45. Id. at 277. 
 46. ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 42, at 195, 198. 
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hand problem. Just as Odysseus’s men were not illegitimately enforcing 
the will of some long-dead decision maker when they refused Odysseus’s 
pleas to be untied, but rather were enforcing the previously revealed 
supreme will of Odysseus himself, the American people might express 
their supreme will in the Constitution, and then rely upon life-tenured 
judges—judges whose ears are filled with beeswax, rendering them 
beyond the reach of short-sighted temptations—to ensure that the people’s 
supreme will is honored. 
Although one wishes he had put it more delicately, Jeremy Waldron 
points us in the right direction when he concludes that “anyone who thinks 
[American constitutionalism] is appropriately modelled by the story of 
[Odysseus] and the Sirens is an idiot.”47 The analogy suffers from two 
central problems. First, as Professor Elster readily acknowledges, there is a 
critical difference between Odysseus’s act of binding himself and 
constitution-makers’ act of binding others.48 Those who ratified the 
Constitution elected to try to bind not only themselves, but future 
generations who were not even parties to the deliberations, as well.49 What 
gave the founding generation the right to impose constraints on the kinds 
of laws that future political majorities might wish to create? It seems 
patently clear that X’s self-binding is not politically or morally equivalent 
to X’s attempt to bind its successor, Y, regardless of whether X and Y are 
individuals or political majorities.50 That is not to say that X can never 
bind Y—it is only to say that the legitimacy of X’s attempt to bind Y is not 
nearly as self-evident as the legitimacy of X’s attempt to bind itself. Even 
some members of the founding generation questioned the legitimacy of 
 
 
 47. WALDRON, supra note 11, at 268. Elster acknowledges ways in which the analogy breaks 
down. See ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 42, at 196 (acknowledging that “the analogy 
between individual and political self-binding is severely limited”); ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND, supra 
note 42, at 92–95 (describing some of the analogy’s limitations). 
 48. See ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND, supra note 42, at 92 (acknowledging that “constitutions 
may bind others rather than being acts of self-binding”). 
 49. See Barnett, supra note 18, at 636–37 (suggesting that the Constitution cannot acquire its 
binding force on us today merely by virtue of the ratifiers’ consent, because the ratifiers had no right to 
bind current and future dissenters). 
 50. Paul Brest makes the point well: 
According to the political theory most deeply rooted in the American tradition, the authority 
of the Constitution derives from the consent of its adopters. Even if the adopters freely 
consented to the Constitution, however, this is not an adequate basis for continuing fidelity to 
the founding document, for their consent cannot bind succeeding generations. We did not 
adopt the Constitution, and those who did are dead and gone. 
Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 225 (1980) 
(footnotes omitted); see also supra note 24 (citing authorities making the same point). 
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attempting to bind future Americans.51 Thomas Paine argued, for example, 
that “[t]he vanity and presumption of governing beyond the grave is the 
most ridiculous and insolent of all tyrannies,” and that “[e]very age and 
generation must be free to act for itself in all cases as the ages and 
generations which preceded it.”52 In Noah Webster’s view, the attempt to 
establish a perpetual constitution was an “arrogant and impudent” 
attempt53 to “legislate for those over whom we have as little authority as 
we have over a nation in Asia.”54 
Second, even if the founding generation could legitimately bind its 
successors with a set of constitutionally enshrined precommitments, the 
nature of the Founders’ actual precommitments is often far from clear. 
Although the content of Odysseus’s supreme will was obvious—his men 
were to ensure that they and Odysseus continued sailing past the Sirens’ 
island—the content of the Constitution’s precommitments is frequently the 
subject of great controversy. Professor Waldron persuasively argues that 
constitutional disputes are more akin to a scenario in which a person torn 
between religious faith and religious doubt decides to go the way of faith, 
and so asks her friend to take custody of the books in her library that tend 
to inflame her skepticism.55 When the would-be believer later asks the 
friend to return the books, the friend cannot confidently identify the 
would-be believer’s preeminent wishes. The friend has no choice but to 
take sides in the dispute between the would-be believer’s conflicting 
inclinations.56 Courts asked to resolve constitutional disputes are often 
similarly asked to take sides in a battle between conflicting—but 
nevertheless reasonable—interpretations of the ratified texts. In such 
cases, one cannot convincingly contend that politically insulated courts are 
simply enforcing the clear and supreme will of the people. 
These two criticisms of the Odysseus analogy track the two central 
components of originalists’ vision of the relationship between their 
 
 
 51. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in WRITINGS 959, 
963 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (“[N]o society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a 
perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living generation.”). 
 52. THOMAS PAINE, Rights of Man, in COMMON SENSE, RIGHTS OF MAN, AND OTHER 
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 129, 138 (Signet Classics 2003) (1791). 
 53. Webster, supra note 1, at 139. 
 54. Giles Hickory [Noah Webster], On Bills of Rights, 1 AM. MAG. 13, 14 (1787). Webster 
focused his criticism on constitutions that purported to be unamendable. See id. (“If . . . our posterity 
are bound by our constitutions, and can neither amend nor annul them, they are to all intents and 
purposes our slaves.”). 
 55. WALDRON, supra note 11, at 268–69. 
 56. See id. at 269. 
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interpretive methods and judicial supremacy.57 The first problem concerns 
the democratic legitimacy of privileging the original meaning of an open-
ended constitutional text over the meaning that a majority of Americans 
would ascribe to the same text today. The second problem concerns the 
democratic legitimacy of giving politically unaccountable judges the 
ultimate authority to resolve reasonable disputes over the meaning of the 
Constitution’s open-ended provisions, regardless of whether the 
competing interpretations are grounded in originalism or some other 
interpretive methodology. I take up the second problem in Part II. For the 
remainder of Part I, however, I wish to focus on the first problem—the 
problem of privileging original meaning over contemporary meaning. 
Let us assume that, in a given case, the original meaning of an open-
ended constitutional provision—such as the right to the freedom of speech, 
equal protection, or due process of law—can be discerned with sufficient 
clarity to adjudicate the facts of a dispute arising under that provision. 
(That is often a dubious assumption, as critics of originalism have pointed 
out,58 but I wish to make it here so that I can proceed with a further 
critique of the problems that arise when one gives dispositive force to 
constitutional meanings shaped by the dead hand of the past.) Let us 
further assume that the original meaning of the constitutional provision at 
issue conflicts with the interpretation favored by a contemporary majority 
of Americans. Why is it that the meaning assigned in an era long past 
should prevail? Scholars have proposed a number of possible responses, 
none of which is fully satisfying. I briefly consider five of the leading 
responses here. 
B. Failed Rationales for Privileging Original Meaning over 
Contemporary Meaning 
1. The Framers Were Wiser and Less Self-Interested than We Are 
In Federalist No. 49, James Madison considered the suggestion that a 
constitutional convention be called to consider amendments whenever 
Congress determined by a two-thirds vote that such a convention would be 
useful.59 After conceding that some might initially find the proposal 
 
 
 57. See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text (describing originalists’ traditional 
formulation). 
 58. See supra note 23 (citing sources arguing that originalism is far more indeterminate than its 
proponents acknowledge). 
 59. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 310 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
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appealing—the American people are the nation’s ultimate sovereign, after 
all, and so discovering the people’s wishes by holding conventions might 
seem perfectly natural60—Madison rejected it as unwise. He argued that 
drafting constitutional provisions is a “ticklish” business and he urged his 
contemporaries not to assume that future Americans would rise to the 
challenge.61 Members of the founding generation, Madison argued, faced 
great dangers that caused them to suppress “the passions most unfriendly 
to order and concord” and to “stifle[] the ordinary diversity of opinions on 
great national questions.”62 In his view, there was little reason to believe 
that future generations would be similarly inspired to rise above the muck 
of ordinary politics and to place themselves in a trustworthy, constitution-
writing frame of mind.63 
Madison’s argument lends weight to the possibility that “constitution-
makers regard themselves as superior both to the corrupt or inefficient 
regime they are replacing and to the interest- and passion-ridden regimes 
that will replace them.”64 As Professor Elster concludes, however, “[t]he 
idea that framers are demigods legislating for beasts is a fiction.”65 The 
view errs both by overemphasizing the Framers’ wisdom and moral 
reliability and by underestimating subsequent generations’ ability to act 
responsibly. Michael Klarman nicely makes the first point, reminding us 
that, “[n]o matter how smart the Framers were, they still held slaves and 
subordinated women[,] . . . and they wrongly assumed basic demographic, 
political, and other facts about the world.”66 Historians, moreover, have 
“describ[ed] in rich detail the self-interested political horsetrading that 
characterized the constitutional convention,” leading to such provisions as 
the temporary ban on congressional interference with slavery and the equal 
representation of the differently populated states in the Senate.67 It is far 
from clear, therefore, that the Framers operated on a rarified moral plain 
beyond the reach of ordinary Americans. 
The second point—that the solution to the dead-hand problem cannot 
lie with discounting the deliberative capacities of modern Americans—is 
 
 
 60. See id. at 311 (stating that the Constitution’s authority flows from the people and that one 
might thus conclude that the people “can alone declare [the Constitution’s] true meaning, and enforce 
its observance”).  
 61. Id. at 312. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id.  
 64. ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND, supra note 42, at 115. 
 65. Id. at 172. 
 66. Klarman, Antifidelity, supra note 24, at 388–89. 
 67. Id. at 389–90; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (forbidding congressional interference with 
the slave trade until 1808); id. § 3, cl. 1 (apportioning two Senators to each state). 
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the point that Noah Webster was making in the passage that appears at the 
beginning of this Article.68 Webster rejected the proposition that future 
generations of political leaders would “be less honest—less wise—and 
less attentive to the interest of the State” than his contemporaries.69 There 
is indeed something fundamentally amiss if we assume that Americans 
today possess the kinds of rights that are reflected in such texts as the Bill 
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, but that the very same 
autonomy and capacity for deliberation that justify the recognition of those 
rights cannot be trusted to lead Americans to construe those rights 
responsibly today.70 If we are no less deserving than the founding 
generation of the kinds of rights that the Constitution aims to protect, then 
there is good reason to believe that we are no less able to flesh out the 
content of those rights in whatever circumstances we find ourselves 
facing. 
2. The Constitution’s Original Meaning Gives Us the Stability We 
Need to Govern Ourselves 
Resisting the claim that constitutionalism is undemocratic because it 
entails government by the dead hand of the past, Stephen Holmes argues 
that the Constitution actually enhances democracy.71 Professor Holmes 
contends that, by providing a stable governmental framework, the 
Constitution spares modern Americans from being “victimized by the 
urgent need to put an end to the chaos of a sovereignless nation,” and thus 
enables them to focus their energies on achieving their particular political 
goals.72 Several of the First Amendment’s guarantees, for example—those 
protecting the basic rights of speech, press, assembly, and petition73—
provide contemporary Americans with democracy-enhancing ground 
rules.74 Far from undemocratically constraining present-day citizens, 
 
 
 68. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 69. Webster, supra note 1, at 139. 
 70. See WALDRON, supra note 11, at 222 (arguing that entrenching rights in a written 
constitution reflects mistrust in one’s fellow citizens, and that this mistrust “does not sit particularly 
well with the aura of respect for their autonomy and responsibility that is conveyed by the substance of 
the rights which are being entrenched in this way”). 
 71. See Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988). 
 72. Id. at 225. 
 73. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 74. See Holmes, supra note 71, at 233 (“Popular sovereignty is meaningless without rules 
organizing and protecting public debate.”). 
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Professor Holmes suggests, the Constitution enables them “to achieve 
more of their aims than they could if they were left entirely 
unconstrained.”75 Keith Whittington76 and Frank Easterbrook77 reach 
comparable conclusions. 
With respect to those constitutional provisions that straightforwardly 
establish the federal government’s basic structures and that 
unambiguously describe the way in which those structures are to be 
constituted and to function, the stability argument is quite strong.78 Indeed, 
the strength of that argument likely goes a long way toward explaining 
why popular constitutionalists who are otherwise determined to resist the 
dead hand’s grasp have been largely content to regard many of the 
Constitution’s provisions as binding on Americans today.79 As David 
Strauss has observed, “it is more important that some matters be settled 
than that they be settled right,”80 and there certainly are many portions of 
the Constitution that usefully settle matters that we might otherwise find 
ourselves constantly and unprofitably debating. 
The constitutional provisions for which the stability argument is quite 
strong, however, are generally not the provisions that place the dead 
hand’s democratic legitimacy in the sharpest relief. The tension between 
original and contemporary meaning arises most pointedly with respect to 
 
 
 75. Id. at 236; see also id. at 240 (“The dead should not govern the living; but they can make it 
easier for the living to govern themselves.”); accord ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND, supra note 42, at 
155 (“The stabilizing effect of requiring supermajorities for amending the constitution is arguably the 
most important aspect of constitutional precommitment.”); DAVID HUME, Of the Original Contract, in 
ESSAYS, MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 465, 476 (Eugene F. Miller ed., Liberty Classics 1985, 
rev. ed. 1987) (“[A]s human society is in perpetual flux, one man every hour going out of the world, 
another coming into it, it is necessary, in order to preserve stability in government, that the new brood 
should conform themselves to the established constitution . . . .”). 
 76. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 21, at 132–34. Whittington argues: 
The existing Constitution is a placeholder for our own future expression of popular 
sovereignty. . . . We can replicate the fundamental political act of the founders only if we are 
willing to recognize the reality of their act. Stripping them of their right to constitute a 
government would likewise strip us of our own. 
Id. at 133; see also id. at 137 (arguing that the stability the Constitution provides enables citizens to 
focus their energies productively on nongovernmental matters). 
 77. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 
1120 (1998) (“[A]ffirming the force of old laws is essential if sitting legislatures are to enjoy the 
power to make new ones.”); id. at 1122 (“Today’s majority accepts limits on its own power in 
exchange for greater surety that its own rights will be respected when, sometime in the future, power 
has shifted.”). 
 78. See Marmor, supra note 12, at 79 (stating that “the argument from stability would seem to 
make some sense with respect to the structural prong of constitutional entrenchment”). 
 79. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (noting popular constitutionalists’ apparent 
acceptance of some constitutional provisions’ original meaning). 
 80. Strauss, supra note 19, at 907. 
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the Constitution’s open-ended provisions whose meanings are reasonably 
contestable, such as those that appear throughout the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment.81 As Andrei Marmor notes, these provisions 
occupy the “domain of rights and moral principles,” where “it is mostly 
truth that we value, not stability.”82 Far from providing stabilizing 
decision-making structures for substantive democratic deliberations, these 
provisions often are variously interpreted in support of substantive, 
conflicting, values-laden outcomes. The stability argument in this domain 
is considerably less helpful.83 
3. Article V Permits Us to Amend the Constitution if We Are 
Dissatisfied 
Responding to Thomas Jefferson’s well-known suggestion that the 
nation avoid the dead-hand problem by letting the Constitution and all 
other laws expire every twenty years,84 James Madison argued that a 
present-day generation legitimizes old laws with its tacit consent when it 
opts not to change them.85 On this view, enforcing the Constitution’s 
original meaning does not create a legitimacy problem because Article V 
provides mechanisms by which dissatisfied citizens can infuse the 
Constitution with new meaning.86 If citizens are unhappy with the 
Constitution’s content, they can change it; if they decline to change it, we 
can safely assume that they accept the Constitution as it stands. This 
argument apparently satisfied many of the Framers, and at least one 
commentator believes it is “the view of the vast majority of the American 
people today.”87  
The difficulty with this response is that Article V imposes 
supermajority requirements that can leave a political majority bound to 
constitutional meanings that they find objectionable. Article V declares 
that the initial endorsement of either two-thirds of Congress or two-thirds 
 
 
 81. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
 82. Marmor, supra note 12, at 79. 
 83. See McConnell, supra note 36, at 1130 (“Most of what we now think of as constitutional law 
lies outside [the stability argument’s] justification.”). 
 84. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 51, at 963 (“Every 
constitution . . . and every law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If it be enforced longer, it is an 
act of force and not of right.”). 
 85. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 1 LETTERS AND 
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 503, 505–06 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865) 
(making this argument). 
 86. See U.S. CONST. art. V (describing ways in which the Constitution may be amended). 
 87. McConnell, supra note 36, at 1131–32. 
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of the states is required to initiate the amendment process, and that the 
ultimate ratification of three-fourths of the states is required to complete 
it.88 It is entirely possible, therefore, that a majority of Americans might 
disapprove of a given aspect of the Constitution, but be unable to summon 
the supermajority demanded by the founding generation for altering it. 
Pointing to the possibility of amendment thus does not fully address 
concerns regarding the democratic legitimacy of enforcing the 
Constitution’s original meaning.89 As Akhil Reed Amar argues, if 
democratic legitimacy arises from the express or implied consent of the 
governed, then the founding generation cannot be given more than the 
power to declare the status quo until a present-day majority elects to 
change it.90 Professor Amar reasons: 
[S]uppose that the People of 1787 had attempted to make, say, the 
taxing power unamendable, save perhaps by unanimous consent of 
all individuals. Suppose 99.9 percent of all Americans today wanted 
to amend that provision, but could not do so constitutionally. Could 
we really view our Constitution as being of, by, and for the People? 
And if you accept the argument for 99.9 percent, then there is no 
principled way to stop short of 50 percent plus one.91 
4. We Can Amend the Constitution by Means Other than Those 
Described in Article V if We Are Dissatisfied 
If a political majority could amend the Constitution by means other 
than those described in Article V, one might find greater appeal in the 
argument that the Constitution’s original meaning may legitimately be 
 
 
 88. See U.S. CONST. art. V (describing ways in which the Constitution may be amended). 
 89. See Klarman, Antifidelity, supra note 24, at 387 (“The dead-hand problem of 
constitutionalism is not solved by an amendment mechanism biased in favor of the status quo through 
supermajority requirements.”); McConnell, supra note 36, at 1132 (stating that, if a majority—but not 
a supermajority—of Americans consistently resisted the Constitution, “we would have a genuine crisis 
of legitimacy”). Jon Elster suggests that requiring a supermajority to amend the Constitution “is 
justified whenever the minority would rather live under a regime that is preferred by the majority and 
protected by a supermajority requirement than live under its own preferred regime that was not 
similarly protected.” ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND, supra note 42, at 155. Professor Elster’s argument 
does provide a measure of comfort at the level of second-best alternatives, but it still does not provide 
an affirmative rationale for giving the founding generation the power to bind succeeding political 
majorities on particular values-laden issues. 
 90. See Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1074 (1988). 
 91. Id. at 1073. 
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enforced until the nation opts to change the Constitution’s content.92 In 
recent years, numerous scholars have in fact argued—both descriptively 
and normatively—that Article V’s amendment mechanisms are not 
exclusive.93 Bruce Ackerman contends, for example, that on several 
occasions during its history,94 the nation has usefully deployed a 
“movement-party-presidency” method of amending the Constitution, 
involving a social movement by determined citizens, a political party that 
takes up the movement’s cause, and a president who builds a coalition of 
legislators and judges who help to achieve the movement’s objectives.95 
William Eskridge and John Ferejohn argue that the Constitution has 
frequently been amended by “dynamic judicial interpretations of its 
provisions,” in large part because it is “easier . . . than the bulky process of 
formal constitutional amendment entailed by Article V.”96 Reva Siegel 
contends that citizens have altered the Constitution’s meaning by 
 
 
 92. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text (acknowledging a comparable argument based 
on Article V).  
 93. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION 193–96 (1993) 
(suggesting that Article V only constrains how government officials may amend the Constitution, not 
how the American people themselves may do so); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: 
Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 passim (1994) (arguing that 
Article V is not exclusive); Amar, supra note 90 passim (same); Frederick Schauer, Amending the 
Presuppositions of a Constitution, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 145, 160–61 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (concluding that we add or 
subtract from our Constitution when, simply as a “social and political fact,” we begin or cease 
regarding something as our fundamental law). 
 94. Professor Ackerman focuses on the eras of Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the civil rights 
movement of the 1960s. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 47–63 (1991) 
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS] (discussing the New Deal); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 99–252 (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS] 
(discussing Reconstruction); id. at 255–377 (discussing the New Deal); Ackerman, supra note 5, at 
1761–90 (discussing the civil rights movement of the 1960s). 
 95. See Ackerman, supra note 5, at 1759–60 (briefly summarizing his theory); id. at 1762 
(identifying five key phases of the process: “signaling, proposing, triggering, ratifying, and finally 
consolidating the new principles supported by the American people”). Numerous scholars have offered 
critiques of Professor Ackerman’s theory. See, e.g., LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED 
CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 46 (2001) (arguing 
that Professor Ackerman has not persuasively explained why Americans today should be bound by the 
desires of those citizens who successfully amended the Constitution); TUSHNET, supra note 9, at 67–68 
(arguing that theories like Professor Ackerman’s help to explain “why judgments made during times of 
high political mobilization and deliberation about fundamentals might be different from judgments 
made in ordinary politics, but not why they are better”); Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democracy: A 
Review of Ackerman’s WE THE PEOPLE, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 309 passim (1992) (offering numerous 
points of praise and criticism). 
 96. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1267–68 
(2001); accord Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1045, 1068 (2001) (“Partisan entrenchment through presidential appointments to the 
judiciary is the best account of how the meaning of the Constitution changes over time through Article 
III interpretation rather than through Article V amendment.”). 
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participating in social movements.97 David Strauss presses the 
nonexclusivity of Article V to its limits, arguing that we have informally 
amended the Constitution so often that Article V has become virtually 
superfluous.98 
Difficulties arise, however, when one relies upon the possibility of 
non–Article V amendments to legitimize the continued enforcement of the 
Constitution’s original meaning. Theories of amendment outside Article V 
are invariably backward-looking—they seek to establish retrospectively 
that a particular series of historical events (such as elections, social 
movements, or judicial rulings) culminated in an alteration of the 
Constitution’s content. For those present-day citizens who prospectively 
wish to amend the Constitution in a manner that politicians and the courts 
will be obliged to uphold,99 however, the existing theories of alternative 
amendment mechanisms are not particularly helpful. Once they step 
outside the confines of Article V, agitated citizens do not know precisely 
what they must do in order to persuade the nation’s judges that the 
supreme law of the land has been altered.100 Similarly, the nation’s judges 
cannot cite any clear rules of recognition—other than those described in 
Article V—to demonstrate that their revised interpretations of the 
Constitution are based upon a valid amendment rather than their own 
wishful thinking.101 Consequently, unless we can give dissatisfied citizens 
clearer prospective guidance about how they may amend the Constitution 
 
 
 97. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional 
Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1328 (2006) (positing that “movements 
can change the Constitution’s meaning outside Article V”). 
 98. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
1457, 1459 (2001) (positing that, with only a few exceptions, “our system would look the same today 
if Article V of the Constitution had never been adopted and the Constitution contained no provision for 
formal amendment”). 
 99. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (stating that all state and federal legislators and executive and 
judicial officials “shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution”). 
 100. See Amar, supra note 90, at 1092–93 (arguing that Professor Ackerman’s theory is too 
imprecise on such matters as determining when an amendment has been decisively approved through 
electoral victories); Balkin & Levinson, supra note 96, at 1080 (arguing that Professor Ackerman’s 
theory “does not offer much help to someone in the midst of a potential constitutional revolution who 
wants to know what to do”); Sandalow, supra note 95, at 321 (arguing that the constitutional 
significance of electoral victories is often clear only in hindsight); Peter M. Shane, Voting Rights and 
the “Statutory Constitution,” 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 249 (1993) (stating that any theory of 
amendment outside Article V must confront rule of recognition problems); id. at 251 (“When non-
Article V regime changes occur, where will they find at least some authoritative expression to guide 
courts engaged in constitutional adjudication?”). 
 101. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92–114 (1961) (providing a seminal 
discussion of rules of recognition); id. at 113 (stating that, for a legal system to operate satisfactorily, 
“its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication 
must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials”). 
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by means other than those described in Article V, the possibility of non–
Article V amendments cannot assure us that the continued enforcement of 
the Constitution’s original meaning is democratically legitimate. 
5. All Americans—from the Founding Generation to the Present—
Form One Transtemporal National Self 
In an effort to defend the legitimacy of the British monarchy and to 
rebut the claim that Britain’s citizens were entitled to choose their own 
leaders,102 Edmund Burke argued in 1790 that the British people had 
forever surrendered any such right a century earlier.103 Burke contended 
that, in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the British people had made new 
arrangements for the succession of the Crown, and those arrangements 
remained “equally binding on king and people too, as long as the terms are 
observed, and they continue the same body politic.”104 Burke argued that 
Britain’s governmental arrangements were an inheritance that each new 
generation received from its predecessors, that each generation was 
obliged to behave “as if in the presence of canonized forefathers,” and that 
the British people’s freedom thus carried “an imposing and majestic 
aspect” with “illustrating ancestors” and its own “gallery of portraits.”105 
In making that argument, Burke drew upon imagery that had inspired 
some of his predecessors and that continues to inspire some American 
defenders of originalism today. Burke’s argument built upon Richard 
Hooker’s contention in the late sixteenth century that a long-dead 
generation’s consent to a set of laws is sufficient to legitimize the 
continued application of those laws for many centuries to come.106 
Members of a generation-spanning society are joined together as one body 
politic, Hooker argued; just as an individual may make a decision early in 
her life that legitimately binds her later in life, so too can one generation of 
 
 
 102. Burke was responding to a speech delivered by a minister named Richard Price, in which 
Price praised the French Revolution and suggested that Britain’s King was legitimate only because he 
had the support of Britain’s people. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN 
FRANCE 9–13 (Frank M. Turner ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1790). 
 103. See id. at 17 (“So far is it from being true, that we acquired a right by the Revolution [of 
1688] to elect our kings, that if we had possessed it before, the English nation did at that time most 
solemnly renounce and abdicate it, for themselves, and for all their posterity for ever.”). 
 104. Id. at 18. 
 105. See id. at 30; see also id. at 27–30 (presenting Burke’s overarching argument). 
 106. See RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY 194–95 (Ernest Rhys ed., 
Everyman’s Library 1907) (1593). 
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the body politic make decisions that bind its successors.107 Hooker 
concluded: 
Wherefore as any man’s deed past is good as long as himself 
continueth; so the act of a public society of men done five hundred 
years [ago] standeth as theirs who presently are of the same 
societ[y], because corporations are immortal; we were then alive in 
our predecessors, and they in their successors do live still.108 
American scholars sometimes defend originalism’s legitimacy on 
comparable grounds.109 Michael McConnell argues, for example, that 
“[w]e are not alone in the present, but part of a historically continuous 
community,” and that the appropriate mode of constitutional interpretation 
is thus one that lends decisive weight both to the Constitution’s original 
meaning and to the American people’s traditional interpretations of the 
Constitution’s text over time.110 Paul Kahn observes that originalists often 
rely upon transtemporal metaphors, suggesting not merely that we are the 
Founders’ descendants, but that we and the Founders, as well as all 
intervening generations of Americans, are joined together in one 
“American political self.”111 When conceptualizing our relationship with 
the founding generation, this view posits, we must recognize that “we are 
them.”112 Because “we” were present at the founding and committed 
ourselves to a particular set of constitutional meanings, we remain bound 
by those meanings until we decide to change them using one of the 
methods of amendment that “we” specified in Article V at the time of 
ratification.113 When we contemplate the Founders’ act of constitution-
making, therefore, we need to see it not as a problematic act of others-
binding, but rather as an act of self-binding in which all generations of 
 
 
 107. See id.  
 108. Id.; see also Holmes, supra note 71, at 208 (describing Hooker’s argument). Hooker’s 
argument mirrors many Christians’ belief in the “communion of saints,” under which Christians both 
past and present are joined together in one community and are able to pray for one another’s well 
being. See WILLIAM BARCLAY, THE APOSTLES’ CREED FOR EVERYMAN 9–10 (1967) (noting the 
doctrine’s roots in the Apostles’ Creed); CLEMENT H. CROCK, DISCOURSES ON THE APOSTLES’ CREED 
227–28 (1938) (describing a Roman Catholic conception of the doctrine); HENRY BARCLAY SWETE, 
THE HOLY CATHOLIC CHURCH: THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS 147–69, 229–44 (1915) (describing an 
Anglican conception of the doctrine). 
 109. For one presentation of this view, see Lee J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible 
Philosophical Traditions Within Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism Grounded in the Central 
Western Philosophical Tradition, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 909 (2005). 
 110. McConnell, supra note 36, at 1134–36. 
 111. Kahn, supra note 21, at 512–15. 
 112. Id. at 515. 
 113. See Strang, supra note 109, at 913–14. 
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Americans participated, just like Odysseus’s binding of himself to the 
mast.114 
For those Americans who are already inclined to deploy originalism’s 
interpretive methods, this line of argument provides an appealing 
explanation for their willingness to subordinate contemporary meanings to 
those meanings that prevailed far in the past. The argument builds upon 
Americans’ strong sense of national identity and invites them to see 
themselves as organically part of something much greater than their 
individual selves. As Professor Kahn explains, the argument seeks to 
persuade Americans to deny their own absolute freedom and to accept 
their subordination to the Constitution’s original meaning as part of the 
“natural” order.115 Professor Kahn writes: 
[O]riginalism denies that the present decisionmaker has any role 
except as conveyor of the historical facts. The decisionmaker has no 
personal identity: he is only ritualistically mouthing the voice of the 
past. Originalism thereby discourages the separation of the subject 
from the object of political construction. . . .  
 Originalism does all of this by suggesting a “natural” identity 
between the present citizenry and those present at the origin. This is 
the function of the idea of “popular sovereignty,” which is the 
dramatic actor in the myth of originalism. This actor—the popular 
sovereign—suggests identity across time and space. It links not only 
the entire nation at the moment of birth, but the entire nation back to 
the moment of birth.  
 Originalism denies individual freedom by asserting participation 
in the popular sovereign. “Popular sovereignty” asserts that we are 
them.116 
Although it provides originalists with a means of explaining why they 
deem themselves bound by the Constitution’s original meaning, the 
argument does little to persuade those who do not already possess 
originalists’ inclinations. The argument is merely an analogy aimed at 
encouraging modern Americans to see themselves in a particular way. For 
those who decline to regard themselves as organically joined with the 
Founders, the argument can do little to persuade them that original 
meaning must prevail over contemporary meaning. After all, Americans 
 
 
 114. See supra notes 42–56 and accompanying text (discussing the Odysseus analogy). 
 115. Kahn, supra note 21, at 512–13. 
 116. Id. at 514. 
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past and present are not one united self in any literal sense of the term—
there plainly is a difference between saying that an individual remains 
bound by her earlier choices and that Americans today remain bound by 
the choices that other Americans made many generations ago. As Keith 
Whittington writes, America’s many generations “need not be viewed, and 
in fact do not exist, as a single unitary social organism.”117 Rather, as 
Professor Kahn argues, the notion of a transtemporal national self is a 
“myth” that we propagate in order to justify the prevailing political 
order.118 If we prefer, we may reject that myth and recognize that “the 
political order is only an artifact” and that we actually possess “a freedom 
not simply within that order, but a freedom to choose among competing 
political orders.”119 If we choose to reject the transtemporal myth and we 
then encounter constitutional texts that are reasonably susceptible to 
conflicting interpretations, we will find ourselves still questioning the 
democratic legitimacy of being bound to those constitutional meanings 
that were in play more than two hundred years ago.120 
My aim here has not been to conclusively rebut every conceivable 
response that an originalist might make to the dead-hand objection. 
Rather, my goal has been to illustrate just how daunting the dead-hand 
objection is, and how problematic the standard responses to that problem 
are. If we grant our politically unaccountable judges the ultimate authority 
to interpret the Constitution, we undoubtedly want those judges to 
adjudicate cases based on “law,” rather than on their personal 
predilections. As we cast about for the modes of interpretation that we 
want our judges to employ, however, we often find ourselves drawn to 
sources of constitutional meaning that have their roots in the preferences, 
values, or actions of Americans who have long since died. As I noted 
earlier, for example, originalist methods remain frequently deployed by 
originalists and nonoriginalists alike.121 If we cannot persuasively justify 
privileging dead-hand sources of meaning over the meaning that a 
majority of Americans would assign today, then concerns about 
 
 
 117. WHITTINGTON, supra note 21, at 149. 
 118. See Kahn, supra note 21, at 512–15 (describing this myth and the way it is deployed by 
originalists). 
 119. Id. at 513. 
 120. Cf. WALDRON, supra note 11, at 270–75 (acknowledging that people may want to conceive 
of themselves as being joined with their predecessors in a transtemporal political community and thus 
bound by prior generations’ values and political preferences, but concluding that this argument loses 
strength when it is difficult to amend those prior generations’ decisions). 
 121. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text (noting the continued prominence of 
originalist methods of constitutional interpretation). 
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democratic legitimacy give us good reason to question whether it really is 
necessary to give the nation’s supreme interpretive power to judges, whose 
decision-making methods draw heavily from those dead-hand sources. It is 
to the supposed necessity of judicial supremacy that I now turn. 
II. TRUSTING THE PEOPLE 
A. America’s “Dirty Little Secret” and the “Deepest Question of All” 
Because many of the Constitution’s provisions are open-ended in their 
language, the Constitution’s meaning is often highly contested. Regardless 
of whether they rely upon originalist or nonoriginalist modes of 
interpretation, reasonable judges and litigants frequently disagree about 
what, if anything, the Constitution demands in particular cases. When the 
Constitution’s indeterminate language is reasonably susceptible to 
conflicting interpretations and politically unaccountable judges bind the 
nation with the interpretations they favor, we face another problem of 
democratic legitimacy. 
Consider, once again, the analogy to Odysseus and the Sirens.122 
Odysseus’s instructions to his crew members were clear: they were to tie 
him to the mast, plug their ears, and ignore his pleading gestures until they 
had sailed beyond the Sirens’ voices. The Constitution’s demands, 
however, are frequently far less obvious. As a result, one often cannot say 
that courts are simply enforcing the supreme will of the people when they 
adjudicate constitutional disputes.123 Rather, courts are taking sides in 
reasonable arguments about the meaning of the Constitution’s language. It 
is as if Odysseus gave his crew a broad declaration about the ends he 
hoped to achieve—something along the lines of “Take all reasonable steps 
to avoid the seductive dangers that lurk ahead.” As Odysseus’s shipmates 
engaged in their inevitable disputes about the nature of the dangers that 
Odysseus had feared, and about whether this or that course of action 
would be a reasonable means of avoiding them, it would be extraordinarily 
difficult for one member of the crew to demonstrate, over the dissent of 
his colleagues, that he alone accurately perceived Odysseus’s supreme 
will, and that everyone else should defer to his interpretation. Indeed, 
when a majority of the crew finally settled upon an interpretation of 
Odysseus’s indeterminate declaration, their conclusion probably would tell 
 
 
 122. See supra notes 42–56 and accompanying text (discussing the analogy). 
 123. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text (making this argument). 
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us as much about the crew’s preferences as it would about those of 
Odysseus. 
Popular constitutionalists would argue that, if Odysseus’s 
precommitments are not clear, and we do not paternalistically want to 
make Odysseus’s decisions for him but rather want to act in accordance 
with his own wishes, then “there is nothing to do but ask [Odysseus]” to 
clarify his specific intentions.124 If the American people are truly the 
nation’s ultimate sovereign, popular constitutionalists contend, and if the 
specific content of the American people’s fundamental law is ambiguous, 
then the best, most democratically legitimate way to clarify the ambiguity 
is to turn for direction to the people themselves. There is no reason to 
believe, after all, that judges are better able to ascertain the people’s will, 
or better able to engage in the moral and political deliberation that shapes 
the people’s will, than the people themselves.125 Indeed, judges are 
frequently no less divided than the citizenry about how particular 
constitutional disputes should be resolved.126 
As I indicated earlier,127 popular constitutionalists have not yet 
specified the precise means by which the American people are to provide 
their answers to the nation’s reasonably contested constitutional questions. 
Some might favor a regime marked by departmentalism, for example, in 
which the courts share interpretive power with the federal government’s 
political branches.128 Others might see merit in a system of legislative 
supremacy, in which the nation’s supreme interpretive authority rests with 
the people’s elected representatives in Congress.129 Still others might be 
attracted to the populist suggestion that the American people be permitted 
to declare the Constitution’s content through referenda and citizen 
initiatives.130 No matter what the contours of their particular visions, 
 
 
 124. WALDRON, supra note 11, at 265. 
 125. Cf. Marmor, supra note 12, at 85 (“[J]udges are no experts in moral deliberation. . . . Nothing 
in the legal education and legal expertise that judges acquire prepares them better to conduct sound 
moral deliberation than legislators or other (reasonably educated) members of the community.”). 
 126. Id. at 85–86 (“[J]udges in constitutional cases are often just as divided about the conclusion 
as the general public.”). 
 127. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text (discussing popular constitutionalists’ lack of 
clarity about how the American people are to exercise their supreme interpretive power). 
 128. See Fleming, supra note 40, at 1379 (defining “departmentalism” as “the idea that 
legislatures and executives share with courts authority to interpret the Constitution and indeed are the 
ultimate interpreters on certain questions”). 
 129. See VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 268–82 (arguing in favor of legislative supremacy). 
 130. While not rejecting judicial supremacy, both Bruce Ackerman and Akhil Reed Amar have 
written favorably about allowing the American people to amend the Constitution outside Article V, 
through popular referenda or initiatives. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 94, at 54–55 
(arguing that we should consider allowing the President and a supermajority of Congress to propose 
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however, popular constitutionalists share a deep faith in citizens’ ability to 
constrain themselves and their elected officials in the kinds of desirable 
ways that lead us to value the Constitution in the first place. 
Yet when one expresses such faith in the American people, one runs 
squarely into what Roberto Unger has described as one of the “dirty little 
secrets of contemporary jurisprudence.”131 Despite their rhetoric, the 
United States and many other western nations are profoundly 
uncomfortable with democracy.132 Professor Unger contends that this 
discomfort reveals itself in numerous ways—in the “ceaseless 
identification of restraints upon majority rule,” in the frequent reliance 
upon judges to secure changes in public policy, in “the single-minded 
focus upon the higher judges and their selection as the most important part 
of democratic politics,” and in the desire to reduce democratic 
deliberations to something akin “to a polite conversation among gentlemen 
in an eighteenth-century drawing room.”133 Larry Kramer makes the same 
point, observing that “skepticism about people and about democracy is a 
pervasive feature of contemporary intellectual culture”134 and that this 
skepticism usually prompts us to reserve the realm of lawmaking and law 
interpreting “for a trained elite of judges and lawyers.”135 
In the United States, this discomfort with the citizenry’s governmental 
capacities is hardly a recent development. One finds manifestations of it, 
for example, in John Adams’s rejection of Thomas Paine’s populism136 
and in the Federalists’ desire in the late eighteenth century to disassociate 
themselves from developments in France.137 James Madison famously 
 
 
amendments to the citizenry, with citizens then approving or disapproving those amendments in a 
national referendum); ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 94, at 415 (arguing that we should 
consider “popular sovereignty initiatives,” pursuant to which the President would submit a proposed 
constitutional amendment to Congress, and then, upon securing Congress’s approval by a two-thirds 
vote, the proposed amendment would require approval in a ballot measure presented to the citizenry in 
two successive presidential election seasons); Amar, supra note 90, at 1044–46, 1060–61 (suggesting 
that a constitutional convention could propose amendments that would then be ratified or rejected by a 
popular majority vote in a national referendum). 
 131. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 72 (1996). 
 132. See id. at 72–73. 
 133. Id.  
 134. KRAMER, supra note 7, at 243. 
 135. Id. at 7. 
 136. See HARVEY J. KAYE, THOMAS PAINE AND THE PROMISE OF AMERICA 52 (2005) (noting that 
Thomas Paine and John Adams deeply disagreed about ordinary people’s capacity for self-
government); id. at 53 (“In the Adams-Paine exchange we see the beginnings of the perennial contest 
in American political culture between those who would try to set limits to the expansion of democracy 
and those who would seek to extend and deepen it.”). 
 137. See KRAMER, supra note 7, at 134 (stating that, in an effort to capitalize on the public’s anti-
France sentiment in the wake of the XYZ Affair, the Federalists unleashed “a relentless stream of 
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articulated some of the reasons for this mistrust of rule by ordinary 
citizens in Federalist No. 10.138 When a popular majority is allowed to 
place its hands directly on the levers of governmental power, Madison 
argued, there is a great risk that the majority will “sacrifice to its ruling 
passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens.”139 
“If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide,” he wrote, “we 
well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an 
adequate control.”140 In Madison’s view, therefore, pure democracies 
inevitably devolve into “spectacles of turbulence and contention” and are 
“incompatible with personal security or the rights of property.”141 The 
cure, he argued, was the Constitution’s system of representative 
government, in which each elected official represents a geographical area 
encompassing citizens of diverse interests, thereby making it less likely 
that any “improper or wicked project” will spread beyond localized areas 
and “pervade the whole body of the Union.”142 
True to those convictions, the Constitution that Madison and his 
colleagues produced at the Philadelphia Convention does not expressly 
acknowledge any way in which ordinary Americans can engage in direct, 
unmediated lawmaking at the federal level.143 The business of policy 
making is committed entirely to elected officials. The amendment 
mechanisms described in Article V similarly require that the amendment 
process be initiated by elected state or federal officials, rather than directly 
 
 
propaganda calling upon Americans to reject the French-influenced, popular politics of Jefferson and 
return to a virtuously passive and deferential concept of democratic citizenship”); Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 51, at 963 (“This principle that the earth belongs to the living 
and not to the dead is of very extensive application and consequences in every country, and most 
especially in France.”). See generally DAVID J. SIEMERS, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: MEN OF GREAT 
FAITH AND FORBEARANCE 29 (2003) (“Most Antifederalists had faith in a more popular brand of 
government than the Federalists did.”). 
 138. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
 139. Id. at 75. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 76. 
 142. Id. at 79. 
 143. See Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional 
Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 165 (1996) (arguing that “the Constitution was designed to 
prevent all unmediated lawmaking by the people”). See generally KRAMER, supra note 7, at 47 (“The 
men who led the campaign for a new Constitution were not fans of the people out-of-doors; they 
preferred a more sedate style of politics, safely controlled by gentlemen like themselves.”); id. at 121 
(“In its most extreme manifestations, Federalism exhibited open contempt for ordinary citizens and a 
sure conviction that republicanism would fail unless those citizens left problems of governing to their 
social and intellectual betters.”); id. at 132 (arguing that, by the end of the eighteenth century, many 
Federalists were shifting “from seeing judicial review mainly as a device to protect the people from 
their governors, to viewing it first and foremost as a means of guarding the Constitution from the 
people”). 
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by citizens themselves.144 Making constitutional amendments any easier, 
Madison argued, would needlessly stir up people’s passions and “agitate 
the public mind more frequently and more violently than might be 
expedient.”145 
That same mistrust of the American people reveals itself when we 
insist that the federal courts retain the supreme interpretive power on 
disputed questions of constitutional law. We worry that, if the interpretive 
power were somehow placed in the popular domain, citizens would not 
distinguish between their interpretation of the Constitution’s fundamental 
demands, on the one hand, and their raw political desires, on the other.146 
In the view of at least some defenders of judicial supremacy, Larry 
Kramer argues that 
ordinary people are emotional, ignorant, fuzzy-headed, and simple-
minded, in contrast to a thoughtful, informed, and clear-headed 
elite. Ordinary people tend to be foolish and irresponsible when it 
comes to politics: self-interested rather than public-spirited, 
arbitrary rather than principled, impulsive and close-minded rather 
than deliberate or logical. Ordinary people are like children, 
really.147 
Fearing what political majorities might do if they remained unchecked by 
external forces, we thus have placed the ultimate power to interpret the 
Constitution in the hands of life-tenured judges who, once seated on the 
bench, are largely beyond the quick, retributive reach of political 
majorities. 
Having long ago ceded the nation’s ultimate interpretive authority to a 
judicial elite, citizens and politicians have sometimes behaved in ways that 
admittedly make it difficult to imagine them wielding greater interpretive 
powers on fundamental questions of constitutional law.148 Akhil Reed 
 
 
 144. See U.S. CONST. art. V (describing means by which the Constitution may be amended). 
 145. Madison, supra note 85, at 504; accord THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison), supra 
note 59, at 312 (“The danger of disturbing the public tranquility by interesting too strongly the public 
passions is a still more serious objection against a frequent reference of constitutional questions to the 
decision of the whole society.”). 
 146. See Fleming, supra note 40, at 1390 (“[I]t is not clear that the people themselves, when they 
triumph over judicial supremacy, are ultimately interpreting the Constitution, as distinguished from it 
simply being the case that public opinion about wants, interests, or justice has prevailed as a fact of 
political power over judicial interpretations of the Constitution.”); cf. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 
96, at 1078 (“[I]n some sense the movement from ordinary politics to constitutional politics is 
seamless, for many Americans have little idea of the exact contours of constitutional doctrine and tend 
to associate the Constitution with whatever they regard as most right and just.”). 
 147. KRAMER, supra note 7, at 242. 
 148. See infra note 172 and accompanying text (citing an example). 
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Amar argues that “the People today are at times irresponsible because they 
have not been given responsibility” and that this has “caused the People’s 
constitutional muscles to atrophy through disuse.”149 As for Congress, 
Mark Tushnet contends that its members suffer from what he calls the 
“judicial overhang” problem—they do not feel obliged to take their 
constitutional obligations as seriously as one might like because they 
believe that the responsibility for identifying legislation’s constitutional 
defects ultimately rests with the courts.150 James Thayer identified the 
same problem more than a century ago, long before the Supreme Court 
had become the overshadowing presence that it is today. When 
determining what the Constitution permits, Professor Thayer wrote, 
members of Congress “have felt little responsibility; if we are wrong, they 
say, the courts will correct it.”151 
Popular constitutionalists thus are swimming against a powerful tide. 
Are there nevertheless good reasons to believe that the American people 
possess the powers of deliberation and restraint necessary to honor the 
distinction that constitutionalism requires between their long-term 
fundamental commitments and their short-term political desires? As 
Professor Amar notes with respect to the comparable question of popular 
majorities’ capacity to craft praiseworthy amendments outside the strict 
requirements of Article V, “[t]his is perhaps the deepest question of all.”152 
One might respond to that question by arguing that defenders of 
judicial supremacy actually underestimate the degree to which legislative 
bodies have behaved laudably in the past, and correspondingly 
overestimate the degree to which the nation’s courts have played a 
countermajoritarian, rights-preserving role. Some scholars have pointed 
out, for example, that the Warren Court—often cited as a prime example 
of a countermajoritarian Court in action—“did not climb out on limbs as 
often as some of its admirers believe,” and “ably represented the American 
majority in most of its rulings.”153 Moreover, the Court’s own record on 
issues of rights is hardly pristine—for every Brown v. Board of 
 
 
 149. Amar, supra note 90, at 1101. 
 150. See TUSHNET, supra note 9, at 57–58, 66. 
 151. Thayer, supra note 32, at 155–56. 
 152. Amar, supra note 90, at 1101. 
 153. LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 125; accord LUCAS A. 
POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 215–16 (2000) (positing that the 
conventional wisdom about the Warren Court’s countermajoritarianism is false and that the Warren 
Court actually “conformed to the values that enjoyed significant national support in the mid-1960s”). 
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Education154 that judicial supremacists can cite, popular constitutionalists 
can cite a Scott v. Sandford.155 
Although that is a promising line of argument, I wish to take a 
complementary but different tack. I wish to argue directly that the 
American people today are worthy of the faith that popular 
constitutionalists urge us to place in them. 
B. Reasons to Trust the People’s Commitment to Constitutionalism 
In this section, I identify five separate reasons to believe that, if the 
ultimate power to interpret the Constitution’s indeterminate provisions 
were shifted from the courts to the political domain, the American people 
would prove themselves able and willing to distinguish between their 
long-term fundamental commitments and their short-term political desires 
in the kinds of ways that constitutionalism demands. 
1. The Centrality of the Founders and the Constitution to Americans’ 
Self-Understanding 
Earlier, when considering the ways in which originalists attempt to 
justify privileging original meaning over contemporary meaning, I 
considered Edmund Burke’s argument that a nation’s many generations 
form a transtemporal national self.156 While acknowledging the Burkean 
myth’s appeal, I rejected it as a theory of why Americans today, whether 
they like it or not, are bound by the Constitution’s original meaning. 
Because the notion of a transtemporal national self is not grounded in 
literal truth, it can only serve as a mere invitation to modern Americans to 
see themselves in a particular way in relation to their predecessors—an 
invitation that one may reasonably reject.157 
Although it fails as a rationale for inflexibly privileging the 
Constitution’s original meaning, the myth of a transtemporal national self 
points us toward the first reason to predict that Americans today could 
responsibly interpret the Constitution for themselves, without the binding 
supervision of politically insulated courts. Burke advised his British 
contemporaries to behave as if they were “in the presence of canonized 
 
 
 154. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racially segregated public education is unconstitutional). 
 155. 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (holding that persons of African descent were not citizens of the United 
States and thus could not invoke the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction, and that Congress behaved 
unconstitutionally when it declared slaves in a region of the country free). 
 156. See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text (introducing the Burkean myth). 
 157. See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text (rejecting the Burkean myth). 
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forefathers” and to recognize that their freedom carried “an imposing and 
majestic aspect” with “illustrating ancestors” and a “gallery of 
portraits.”158 Such advice resonates powerfully in American culture today. 
We are, in short, exceedingly reluctant to do anything that would open us 
to the charge that we are breaking faith with either the Founders or the 
Constitution. 
Tracing our political ancestry to its late eighteenth-century roots 
provides us with a widely shared dimension of our self-understanding as 
Americans. As Stephen Carter observes, much of the Constitution’s 
popularity as an object of reverence “flows from a mythos that venerates 
the Founders” and that sees them as “larger-than-life figures who met at 
Philadelphia at the dawn of the nation’s history and joined in the most 
successful act of constitutional creation the world has ever known.”159 
Even among those who do not count themselves as originalists, associating 
one’s constitutional views with those of the Founders carries tremendous 
rhetorical power.160 Although we are not strictly bound by the founding 
generation’s values and expectations, we do not disregard those values or 
expectations lightly.161 Our desire to see ourselves as tightly joined with 
the nation’s first leaders gives us a strong incentive not to deviate 
recklessly far afield from the central values that we believe they embraced. 
Playing an even greater role than the Founders in shaping our political 
identities today are the Constitution and its core values of liberty and 
equality. As Max Lerner wrote nearly three-quarters of a century ago, 
“[e]very tribe needs its totem and its fetish, and the Constitution is 
ours.”162 Indeed, reverence for the Constitution is one of the American 
tribe’s chief defining features. In their interviews with numerous 
Americans, Robert Bellah and his coauthors discovered “a widespread and 
strong identification with the United States as a national community.”163 
Membership in that community is defined by, more than anything else, a 
 
 
 158. BURKE, supra note 102, at 30. 
 159. Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and 
Administrative Government, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 368–69 (1990). 
 160. See supra note 18 (citing authorities for the proposition that originalist methods are widely 
used by self-declared originalists and nonoriginalists alike). 
 161. Cf. WALDRON, supra note 11, at 273–74 (finding value in claims of political ancestry, so 
long as the present generation has significant opportunities to change prior generations’ 
constitutionalized precommitments when those precommitments have become undesirable). 
 162. Lerner, supra note 16, at 1294; see also id. (stating that “the very habits of mind begotten by 
an authoritarian Bible and a religion of submission to a higher power have been carried over to an 
authoritarian Constitution and a philosophy of submission to a ‘higher law’”). 
 163. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART 250 (1996). 
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commitment to the Constitution’s principles of liberty and equality,164 
which rest at the heart of what Gunnar Myrdal called “the American 
Creed.”165 
Although they may disagree sharply about what the Constitution 
demands, Americans today are convinced that a commitment to 
constitutionalism in general, and to the core values of the United States 
Constitution in particular, are central to what it means to be a full-fledged 
member of the American community. To violate one’s perception of what 
the nation’s fundamental law demands would be to undercut a vital 
dimension of one’s own identity and self-understanding. We thus have 
good reason to anticipate that, if they were given the ultimate authority to 
interpret the Constitution, ordinary Americans would take seriously the 
tasks of distinguishing between their long-term constitutional 
commitments and their short-term political desires, and of ensuring that 
the former were not sacrificed to the latter.166 
2. The Increased Value of Americans’ Constitutional Inheritance 
At the time of the Constitution’s ratification, it was far from clear 
whether the Founders’ hopes of building an enduring constitutional regime 
would be met. The Articles of Confederation had been a disaster167 and 
Americans were closely divided on whether the new Constitution would 
take the country in a more promising direction.168 Over the past two 
 
 
 164. See WALTER BERNS, MAKING PATRIOTS 50 (2001) (stating that our adherence to these 
principles is what makes us “one people”); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 11 (1999) (“The Constitution 
helps create a national identity . . . .”). 
 165. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 8 (20th anniversary ed. 1962) (“For 
practical purposes the main norms of the American Creed as usually pronounced are centered in the 
belief in equality and in the rights to liberty.”); see also SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? 46 
(2004) (“Americans, it is often said, are a people defined by and united by their commitment to the 
political principles of liberty, equality, democracy, individualism, human rights, the rule of law, and 
private property embodied in the American Creed.”). 
 166. Cf. TUSHNET, supra note 9, at 65–66 (arguing that elected officials have an incentive to 
interpret the Constitution responsibly because the Constitution is popular with their constituents). 
 167. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of 
“Incomes,” 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1068 (2001) (“The Articles of Confederation had been a fiscal 
disaster, with the purportedly ‘national’ government’s having absolutely no taxing power over 
individual citizens.”); Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A 
Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 867–68 (1989) (“[L]ife under the Articles of 
Confederation had demonstrated that insufficient national power led states to engage in disastrous 
economic warfare . . . .”).  
 168. See JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781–
1788, at 249 & n.1 (1961) (estimating that, at the time of ratification, Americans were nearly evenly 
split between the Federalists who endorsed the Constitution and the Anti-Federalists who opposed it—
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centuries, however, the value of the Constitution’s stock has soared. 
Although it has been formally amended only a handful of times,169 the 
Constitution has helped to provide freedom and security for Americans of 
numerous generations, even as the society in which those Americans live 
has changed dramatically from one era to the next. Of course, the nation’s 
constitutional record is marred by a number of egregious stains—some 
inflicted by the authors of the Constitution itself,170 some inflicted by the 
Supreme Court,171 some inflicted by citizens and elected officials,172 and 
some inflicted by the Court, citizens, and elected officials working 
tragically together.173 As Americans have continued to work out what the 
Constitution’s principles demand in specific situations, however, the 
Constitution’s widely perceived value to the nation has only increased. 
The Constitution’s popularly perceived value underlies the second 
reason to believe that ordinary citizens can be trusted to honor 
constitutionalism’s distinction between ordinary and fundamental law. 
Having inherited a constitutional tradition that has enjoyed such 
remarkable success, Americans have strong incentives to manage that 
inheritance with care. No generation of Americans wants to be the 
generation that causes the Founders’ centuries-spanning experiment with 
constitutionalism to fail. Every generation wants to demonstrate that it can 
manage the Founders’ experiment reliably and that it can bequeath to its 
successors a constitutional regime that is at least as robust as the one it 
inherited. 
Citizens’ and politicians’ rhetoric makes it clear that the public believes 
the nation’s success has its roots in the kinds of fundamental values that 
the Constitution can reasonably be interpreted to enshrine. When debating 
 
 
although the Anti-Federalists may have formed a slight majority—and that the Federalists were clearly 
“a minority in at least six and probably seven states”). 
 169. Of course, it may have been informally amended far more often. See supra notes 93–98 and 
accompanying text (discussing the possibility of amendment outside the requirements of Article V). 
 170. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (banning congressional interference with the slave 
trade prior to 1808); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring any state in which a slave seeks refuge to return the 
slave to the person from whom the slave fled); id. art. V (banning any constitutional amendment that 
would authorize congressional interference with the slave trade prior to 1808). 
 171. See, e.g., Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 426–27 (1857) (holding that, as a slave, Dred Scott 
was not a citizen of the United States and so could not obtain diversity jurisdiction in federal court). 
 172. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 8–12 (1958) (describing efforts by citizens and 
elected officials in Arkansas to resist the Court’s ruling that de jure racial segregation of a state’s 
public schools is unconstitutional). 
 173. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–20 (1944) (upholding the exclusion 
of persons of Japanese descent from specified areas during World War II); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U.S. 537, 542–52 (1896) (upholding a Louisiana law requiring railroads to provide separate cars for 
their black and white passengers). 
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political issues or critiquing courts’ rulings, for example, citizens and 
elected officials routinely make claims about the principles on which the 
nation was built.174 The underlying presumption is that if a principle is 
indeed one on which the nation was founded, then the principle ought to 
be honored and preserved. Of course, citizens and politicians (just like 
judges) often disagree about the precise content of the principles on which 
the nation was established, and about the level of generality at which those 
principles ought to be articulated.175 But there is no question that the 
American people appreciate the importance of identifying their 
fundamental commitments and of honoring those commitments when 
choosing particular courses of action. Distinguishing in this way between 
long-term commitments and short-term objectives is precisely what 
constitutionalism demands. 
3. The Seamlessness of Generational Transitions 
In his 1748 essay Of the Original Contract, David Hume attacked the 
notion that a government acquires its legitimacy from its people’s actual 
consent.176 Hume said that his position might be different if every member 
of each generation entered the historical stage at precisely the same 
moment: 
Did one generation of men go off the stage at once, and another 
succeed, as is the case with silk-worms and butterflies, the new 
race, if they had sense enough to choose their government, which 
 
 
 174. Illustrative examples are unnecessary, as anyone who has lived in the United States is 
familiar with such rhetoric. Indeed, a search in LexisNexis’s news database for the word “principle” 
appearing within the same sentence as the phrase “this nation was built” or “this nation was founded” 
gets rejected because it would produce more than 3,000 hits. 
 175. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality) (stating 
that a court should “refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying 
protection to, the asserted right can be identified”); Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 317, 318 (1990) (“In interpreting the power-granting side of the Constitution, today’s 
Court exhibits no hesitation about the liberating power of abstraction. . . . Instead, the Court saves all 
its doubts about abstract thought for the rights-granting side of the Constitution.”); Klarman, Brown, 
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory, supra note 24, at 1915 (arguing that originalists must confront 
“the difficulty of defending a focus on one out of many possible levels of abstraction at which to 
interpret the original intent”); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the 
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990) (stating the authors’ intent to “challenge[] 
Justice Scalia’s formulation of the levels of generality problem”). 
 176. See HUME, supra note 75, at 465. Hume rejected the argument, for example, that those 
people who choose to remain in the country in which they were born tacitly consent to that country’s 
laws. “We may as well assert,” Hume wrote, “that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to 
the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, 
and perish, the moment he leaves her.” Id. at 475. 
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surely is never the case with men, might voluntarily, and by general 
consent, establish their own form of civil polity, without any regard 
to the laws or precedents, which prevailed among their ancestors. 
But as human society is in perpetual flux, one man every hour going 
out of the world, another coming into it, it is necessary, in order to 
preserve stability in government, that the new brood should 
conform themselves to the established constitution, and nearly 
follow the path which their fathers, treading in the footsteps of 
theirs, had marked out to them.177 
For the sake of achieving stability, Hume argued, a government’s citizenry 
might acquiesce to the regime in which they find themselves living, even 
if they disapprove of many of its important particulars. But the perpetual 
flow of births and deaths makes it impossible to say that, at every given 
moment in time, a government can claim legitimacy as a result of its 
citizens’ affirmative approval.178 
The same seamlessness of generational transitions that made popular 
consent a problematic source of governmental legitimacy for Hume 
provides the third reason to believe that the American people have the self-
discipline required to subordinate their short-term political desires to their 
long-term constitutional commitments. At any given moment, the United 
States is populated by individuals representing the past, the present, and 
the future—those who grew up in an earlier era, those who are just now 
entering their prime, and those who will inherit the governmental regime 
that the current generation of leaders leaves behind. When the nation is 
faced with a constitutional choice, therefore, the citizenry’s grandparents, 
parents, and children provide visible and vocal reminders of those who 
feel attached to the interpretations and traditions of the past, those who are 
taking their turn at society’s helm today, and those who will bear the long-
term consequences of any actions that the current generation of leaders 
chooses to pursue. 
That combination of temporal perspectives among the citizenry makes 
it unlikely that a political majority will regularly and recklessly deviate 
from the nation’s long-term constitutional commitments. If each 
generation of Americans entered and left history’s stage together, like 
Hume’s silk worms and butterflies, each generation not only would be 
able expressly to consent to any governmental arrangements they found 
attractive, as Hume observed, but also would feel comparatively few 
 
 
 177. Id. at 476–77. 
 178. See id.  
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restraints when deciding which particular governmental arrangements to 
adopt. As Hume implied, the generation that moved en masse onto the 
historical stage today might feel little obligation to show respect for the 
judgments of those generations that preceded it. After all, knowing that 
they would be leaving the stage together, those prior generations might 
have felt little impulse to serve as models for their successors, and might 
not have given much thought to the kinds of circumstances in which their 
successors would find themselves living. The generation on the stage 
today might similarly feel free to take significant constitutional risks, 
believing that they are principally gambling only with their own fortunes. 
It is easier to behave shortsightedly when one knows that the 
consequences of one’s actions either will never be inflicted on others or 
will be inflicted only on others whom one will never meet. 
In the real world, however, where generations move seamlessly from 
one to the next, the past, present, and future are all represented to varying 
degrees at every given moment in time. That diversity of temporal 
perspectives increases the likelihood that, when debating the merits of 
short-term objectives and strategies, citizens will find themselves pulled 
toward the common ground provided by the long-term fundamental 
commitments that all of those temporal perspectives purport to share. 
Again, citizens and politicians will disagree amongst themselves about the 
precise content of some of those commitments, but they all will appreciate 
the importance of debating those commitments’ contours and of honoring 
them in the nation’s political undertakings. 
4. The Desire for Politicians Driven by Principles, Rather than Merely 
by Polls 
Political scientists have long distinguished between two different 
models of representation: the delegate model and the trustee model.179 
Under the delegate model, lawmakers’ primary task when crafting 
legislation is to carry out the specific wishes of their constituents.180 Under 
the trustee model, lawmakers are expected to exercise their own 
independent judgment, even when that judgment leads in directions that a 
 
 
 179. See, e.g., JOHN C. WAHLKE ET AL., THE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM: EXPLORATIONS IN 
LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR 272–80 (1962) (distinguishing between these two models and a third 
model—the “politico” model—which combines features of the delegate and trustee models); Dennis F. 
Thompson, Representatives in the Welfare State, in DEMOCRACY AND THE WELFARE STATE 131 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1988) (discussing the delegate and trustee models). 
 180. See WAHLKE ET AL., supra note 179, at 276–77. 
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majority of their constituents might find undesirable.181 The trustee model 
posits, for example, that legislators should follow their own judgments 
when their constituents are not comparably well informed.182 
In American political culture, aspects of both of those models are 
commonly regarded as crucial to effective representation.183 Indeed, 
studies suggest that people do not strongly prefer one model to the 
exclusion of the other.184 Lee Sigelman and his coauthors describe the 
resulting “paradox of leadership”: 
Public officials who pursue policies that are opposed by most 
members of the public leave themselves open to the charge that they 
are arrogantly ignoring “the will of the people”—strong words in a 
democracy. But officials who refuse to step outside the bounds of 
policies that most people favor are no less susceptible to harsh 
criticism, for their caution invites the charge that they are mere 
panderers to the polls who lack conviction and refuse to exercise 
leadership . . . .185 
One can easily see that paradox, for example, in the debate during the 
2008 presidential election season regarding the United States’ military 
presence in Iraq: some candidates wanted to withdraw American troops 
fairly quickly, as those leaders believed the American people desired, 
while other candidates contended that the United States should maintain a 
significant troop presence in Iraq even if it was domestically unpopular.186 
Both of those positions understandably had large constituencies among the 
American public. 
 
 
 181. The trustee model traces its roots to Edmund Burke. See EDMUND BURKE, Speech to the 
Electors of Bristol, in EDMUND BURKE ON GOVERNMENT, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 156, 157 (B.W. Hill 
ed., 1976) (1774) (“Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he 
betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”). 
 182. See WAHLKE ET AL., supra note 179, at 272–75. 
 183. See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 149 (1967) (stating that 
both models have large numbers of adherents in the United States). 
 184. See Lee Sigelman et al., The Public and the Paradox of Leadership: An Experimental 
Analysis, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 366, 380–82 (1992) (summarizing the authors’ empirical findings); cf. id. 
at 381 (suggesting that people might have a small preference for the delegate model when dealing with 
legislators and a small preference for the trustee model when dealing with executives). 
 185. Id. at 366. 
 186. Consider, for example, the debate in 2008 between presidential candidates Senator John 
McCain and Senator Barack Obama about Senator McCain’s comment that he would be willing to 
support maintaining a troop presence in Iraq for the next one hundred years. See Elisabeth Bumiller, 
McCain Leads the Field, but Shuns Talk of Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2008, at A17 (noting the 
debate); Sasha Issenberg, Once Derided as an Idealist, McCain Hands Label to Obama, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 15, 2008, at A10 (same). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss2/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 353 
 
 
 
 
Significant for my purposes here is the second half of Professor 
Sigelman’s paradox—citizens’ belief that politicians should be guided at 
least partially by principles, and not entirely by polls.187 The American 
people recognize that public majorities sometimes favor ill-advised 
courses of action. They acknowledge that either their own preferences or 
the preferences of a majority of their fellow citizens are sometimes 
regrettable, and that the will of political majorities is thus sometimes best 
ignored. What flows from that candid self-assessment? One might initially 
believe it lends weight to the argument that political majorities cannot be 
trusted to self-enforce the distinction between ordinary and fundamental 
law, and that judicial supremacy is thus a necessary component of 
American constitutionalism. If informational or cognitive deficits 
sometimes lead hotheaded or benighted political majorities in unfortunate 
directions on matters of ordinary, day-to-day politics, should one not 
expect those same deficits to lead political majorities to ignore their long-
term constitutional commitments in favor of their short-term political 
desires? 
The American people’s awareness of their own fallibility actually 
provides good reason to believe that the ultimate authority to interpret the 
Constitution could safely be placed in their hands. If the American people 
were reluctant to admit that political majorities’ short-term judgments are 
sometimes mistaken, one would hesitate to place any important matter in 
their hands, much less something as important as interpreting the 
Constitution. After all, one is unlikely to take steps aimed at avoiding 
errors in judgment if one is reluctant to admit that such errors are a 
genuine threat. Ever since the nation’s founding, however, the American 
people have employed modes of self-government that take their own 
deliberative fallibility into account. Recognizing the dangers of invariably 
 
 
 187. Evidence of that belief is easily found. During President George W. Bush’s first term, for 
example, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer described President Bush’s perception of the kind of 
leadership the American people frequently desire: 
The President does not think it’s the task of a leader to govern by the polls. He thinks it’s just 
the opposite. The President believes that a president should work with the Congress in a 
bipartisan way on behalf of what that president, out of principle, thinks is the right thing to 
do. [P]residents who govern by the polls are often seen by the public as weather vanes and not 
leaders . . . . 
Ari Fleischer, White House Press Briefing (June 7, 2001) (on file with author). Senator John Ensign of 
Nevada has similarly argued that “if you govern by polls, that is not leadership. And anybody who just 
governs, basically, wetting their finger, sticking it up, see[ing] which way the wind’s blowing, is not 
. . . a person of courage, not a statesman.” Hardball with Chris Matthews (MSNBC television 
broadcast Jan. 30, 2007) (on file with author); accord Dan Burton, Politics and Consequences, WASH. 
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2007, at A15 (arguing that political leaders sometimes must make decisions “no matter 
how unpopular they are,” rather than allowing the nation to “be governed by pollsters”). 
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relying on the judgment of popular majorities in ordinary political matters, 
for example, the nation not only has conferred its lawmaking power upon 
elected officials who can focus their energies on exercising that power in a 
responsible fashion,188 but also has maintained structures and norms that 
give those elected officials varying measures of freedom to ignore popular 
wisdom when they believe the public’s short-term wishes are unwise. We 
allow our elected federal officials to remain in office for periods ranging 
from two to six years before they have to stand for reelection, for example, 
thus ensuring that many of their decisions can be evaluated from a 
temporal distance.189 Just as importantly, we foster a political culture in 
which political leaders know they may suffer at the ballot box if they 
develop a reputation for merely pandering to the short-term whims of the 
electorate.190 
If the ultimate authority to interpret the Constitution were shifted from 
the courts to the political domain, one thus could reasonably expect that, 
when devising the precise means by which they would manifest their 
interpretive judgments,191 the American people would take steps aimed at 
minimizing the risk that their long-term fundamental commitments would 
be sacrificed to short-sighted political temptations. If the interpretive 
power were exercised principally by elected officials, for example, 
politicians’ perceived fidelity to the Constitution undoubtedly would be a 
recurring election issue. If the people sometimes used popular initiatives 
or referendums to settle constitutional disputes, they likely would see the 
wisdom in implementing a system of procedural rules designed to be sure 
the electorate proceeded with appropriate caution. The American people 
might find merit, for example, in Bruce Ackerman’s analogous discussion 
of the ways in which the nation might amend the Constitution by means 
other than those specified in Article V.192 Professor Ackerman suggests 
that the United States should permit the President to propose specific 
constitutional amendments, with ratification requiring a favorable vote in 
Congress, followed by the citizenry’s direct approval on ballot measures 
 
 
 188. See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text (noting ways in which the Constitution 
deprives ordinary citizens of the ability to engage in unmediated lawmaking). 
 189. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (establishing two-year terms for Representatives); id. § 3 
(establishing six-year terms for Senators); id. art. II, § 1 (establishing four-year terms for the 
President). 
 190. See supra note 187 (citing various politicians’ assessment of the leadership qualities that the 
American people desire). 
 191. As I noted earlier, popular constitutionalists have not yet rallied behind specific proposals 
concerning the ways in which the American people might reveal their constitutional interpretations. 
See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra note 94–95 and accompanying text (noting Professor Ackerman’s argument). 
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presented during two successive presidential election cycles.193 The 
American people’s awareness of political majorities’ fallibility likely 
would prompt them to consider comparably cautious means of interpreting 
the Constitution, so that constitutionalism’s necessary distinction between 
ordinary and fundamental law would be preserved. 
5. The Political Domain’s Long-Standing Supervision of “the 
Constitution Outside the Constitution” 
I acknowledged earlier that the American people and their elected 
representatives sometimes behave irresponsibly on matters involving the 
nation’s fundamental commitments, perhaps believing that the courts will 
correct any egregious errors in constitutional judgment.194 One should not 
conclude, however, that there is a sharp disjunction between the political 
domain and desirable constitutional developments. To a much larger 
extent than many scholars have acknowledged, the people and their 
elected representatives have constructively established what Ernest Young 
calls “the constitution outside the Constitution.”195 As Professor Young 
explains, a nation’s constitution typically does at least two things: “it 
establishes the various institutions of the government and sets out their 
powers and obligations,” and “[i]t identifies certain rights of individuals 
against that government.”196 When one searches for the sources of law that 
perform those constitutional functions in the United States, one finds that 
“much of the law that constitutes our government and establishes our 
rights derives from legal materials outside the Constitution itself.”197 
With respect to establishing the federal government’s structures and 
institutions, for example, an enormous proportion of the government’s 
work is performed by institutions that owe their creation and powers to 
statutes and presidential orders, rather than the text of the Constitution.198 
Professor Young points out that even Congress’s day-to-day operations are 
“framed largely by extracanonical materials,” reflected in such long-
standing practices as Congress’s organization along party lines, 
Congress’s heavy use of an intricate committee system, and “[e]ven the 
 
 
 193. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 94, at 415 (briefly outlining his proposal). 
 194. See supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text (making this observation). 
 195. Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 473 (2007). 
 196. Id. at 411–12; see also id. at 412 (noting that constitutions sometimes perform a third 
function—namely, “entrench[ing] these structures against change, absent compliance with a difficult 
amendment procedure”). 
 197. Id. at 413. 
 198. See id. at 417. 
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basic principle that a bare majority in each house is sufficient to approve 
legislation.”199 With respect to establishing individual rights, Professor 
Young emphasizes that “many rights that are fundamental for individuals 
in modern America”—rights involving such matters as race, gender, age, 
disability, food, housing, health care, and retirement security—“are 
entirely creatures of statute.”200 
A few other scholars have similarly recognized the significant degree 
to which the United States’ constitutional functions are performed by 
sources of law other than the text of the 1789 document and its formal 
amendments. As I noted earlier, for example, David Strauss argues that we 
have informally changed the nation’s constitutional order so frequently 
that Article V has become largely irrelevant.201 Keith Whittington 
contends that the political branches have developed elaborate 
“constitutional constructions” aimed at filling in the gaps created by the 
Constitution’s indeterminacy on matters involving both institutional 
structures and individual rights.202 Benjamin Berger points out that the 
United States’ constitution today “is, in important ways, an informal, 
unwritten entity, even in its structural dimensions.”203 
Because the political domain is already responsible for carrying out so 
much of the nation’s constitutional work, there is reason to believe that it 
could responsibly interpret the open-ended commitments enshrined in the 
1789 document and its formal amendments, as well. After all, there are no 
essential differences between the subject matter of those constitutional 
commitments that appear in the ratified, uppercase-c Constitution and 
those that the political domain has placed in the unratified, lowercase-c 
constitution. Both sets of commitments concern governmental structures 
and individual rights, and both require the application of fundamental 
principles to which the nation has deep attachments.204 Absent some vital 
difference between the two sets of commitments—a difference so 
 
 
 199. Id. at 419–20. 
 200. Id. at 424. 
 201. See Strauss, supra note 98, at 1459; id. at 1469–75 (pointing to the growth in Congress’s 
legislative powers, the President’s executive powers, and administrative bodies’ rulemaking and 
adjudicative powers as examples); see also supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting Professor 
Strauss’s argument). 
 202. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 164, at 9; see also id. at 208 (stating that “the political 
branches . . . [have] sought, by their own methods and forms of argument, to elucidate the meaning of 
the Constitution and to realize its terms in political practice”). 
 203. Benjamin L. Berger, White Fire: Structural Indeterminacy, Constitutional Design, and the 
Constitution Behind the Text, 3 J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 28, on file with 
Washington University Law Review). 
 204. Cf. WHITTINGTON, supra note 164, at 9 (stating that the political branches’ constitutional 
constructions “address constitutional subject matter”). 
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significant that they should be assigned different interpretive authorities—
one can reasonably conclude that the political forces we trust to shape and 
interpret the constitution outside the Constitution may be trusted to 
interpret the open-ended provisions of the formally ratified Constitution as 
well. 
There is only one apparent and overarching difference between the 
commitments made in the ratified and unratified constitutions: the ratified 
Constitution’s commitments purport to be deeply entrenched, alterable 
only by the extraordinary means described in Article V,205 whereas the 
unratified constitution’s commitments remain subject to change by 
ordinary legislation. One might thus argue that, if the point of entrenching 
a set of commitments is to remove those commitments from the reach of 
ordinary politics, then placing the written Constitution’s commitments 
under the care of the political domain would undercut the very reason for 
declaring those commitments entrenched. 
Although not without superficial appeal, that line of reasoning is 
ultimately unpersuasive. First, as I have noted,206 the Constitution has been 
amended on multiple occasions using non–Article V methods. The degree 
of entrenchment that purportedly distinguishes the commitments made in 
the ratified and unratified constitutions thus may not be of sufficient 
magnitude to warrant placing those two sets of commitments under the 
ultimate supervision of two different interpretive authorities. 
Second, it is a mistake to assume that the American people’s practice 
of formally ratifying constitutional texts necessarily presumes a regime in 
which politically unaccountable judges hold the supreme interpretive 
authority. The texts themselves do not articulate that presumption, and the 
ratification of numerous texts between 1787 and 1789 certainly did not 
relieve the Marshall Court and its successors from having to lay the 
groundwork for their eventual claim of interpretive supremacy.207 The 
practice of ratifying texts certainly is aimed at guiding and constraining 
those who interpret the nation’s constitution, but it does not make any 
necessary presumptions about who those interpreters will be. 
 
 
 205. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 206. See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text (describing scholars’ accounts of 
constitutional amendments by means other than those described in Article V). 
 207. The Marshall Court claimed the power of judicial review in 1803. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is.”). The Court did not definitively claim interpretive supremacy, however, until 
1958. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (claiming that “the federal judiciary is supreme in 
the exposition of the law of the Constitution”). 
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Finally—and here we come full circle, back to one of the primary 
reasons that popular constitutionalists urge us to reject judicial 
supremacy—many of the commitments that appear in the ratified 
Constitution are enshrined in open-ended provisions whose specific 
meanings are reasonably contestable.208 Citizens, politicians, and judges 
often reasonably disagree amongst themselves when trying to ascertain the 
specific content of many of the commitments made in such texts as the 
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. When dealing with those 
constitutional provisions that are reasonably susceptible to conflicting 
interpretations, what metric are we to use when determining whether the 
interpretation favored by a political majority honors constitutionalism’s 
distinction between ordinary and fundamental law? One cannot simply use 
one’s own preferred interpretation as the measure by which all other 
interpretations are judged—to do so would beg the question of whose 
interpretations should prevail when reasonable interpreters disagree about 
the text’s meaning. When we ask whether the American people can be 
trusted to preserve the distinction between ordinary and fundamental law 
in their interpretations of the Constitution’s open-ended provisions, 
therefore, there is a sense in which we are asking a question that must be 
answered in the affirmative in all but the most egregious cases. After all, 
to determine whether a political majority’s preferred interpretation 
amounts to a breach of the American people’s long-term commitments, we 
need to know what those long-term commitments actually are. When 
reasonable people disagree about the content of those commitments, we 
lack a clear and neutral measure by which to evaluate the political 
majority’s judgment. Unless a political majority settles upon an 
interpretation that plainly falls beyond the range of interpretations that a 
reasonable interpreter could assign to the text, we really have no clear 
basis on which to refute the American people’s claim that their preferred 
interpretation does indeed honor constitutionalism’s distinction between 
ordinary and fundamental law.209 
 
 
 208. See supra notes 3, 55–56, 122–23 and accompanying text (making this point). 
 209. Cf. Thayer, supra note 32, at 144 (arguing that the political branches’ constitutional 
interpretations should prevail unless the matter “is not open to rational question”). 
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CONCLUSION 
On January 28, 2008, President George W. Bush closed his final State 
of the Union Address with the following words: 
By trusting the people, our Founders wagered that a great and noble 
nation could be built on the liberty that resides in the hearts of all 
men and women. By trusting the people, succeeding generations 
transformed our fragile young democracy into the most powerful 
nation on Earth and a beacon of hope for millions. And so long as 
we continue to trust the people, our nation will prosper, our liberty 
will be secure, and the state of our Union will remain strong.210 
Yet for a nation that routinely trumpets its faith in the judgment of 
ordinary Americans and that grounds its claims of constitutional 
legitimacy in the will of the American people, we have been 
extraordinarily reluctant to allow the American people themselves to play 
the leading role in determining what the Constitution demands. The 
nation’s politically insulated judges have claimed the supreme interpretive 
authority for themselves and, thus far, the nation has acquiesced. 
Of course, when interpreting the Constitution’s requirements, judges do 
purport to be enforcing the textually expressed will of the American 
people. In many cases, however, the Constitution’s open-ended provisions 
are reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations, giving rise to the 
very real possibility that the interpretation chosen in a given case by a 
majority of the Supreme Court will conflict with the interpretation favored 
by a majority of the American people. When that occurs, the familiar 
dead-hand objection demands a response. Originalist and nonoriginalist 
judges alike frequently draw constitutional meaning from sources that 
have their roots deep in the past, whether those sources be the Framers’ 
original intentions, the ratifiers’ original understandings, the text’s original 
meaning, the nation’s traditions, or prior generations’ social movements. 
Defenders of judicial supremacy must explain why it is that, when there is 
a conflict between the constitutional meaning that the courts have 
uncovered from the past and the constitutional meaning that a majority of 
Americans would assign to the text today, the former must prevail. 
All of the leading responses to the dead-hand objection are 
problematic. The Framers were not gods possessed of wisdom and 
 
 
 210. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2008), available at http://www.white 
house.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080128-13.html. 
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selflessness unlike anything modern Americans can match;211 a desire for 
governmental stability cannot justify frustrating the will of a majority in 
those values-laden areas where it is less important that a matter be settled 
than that it be settled correctly;212 Article V’s supermajority requirements 
can prevent an unhappy majority from indisputably changing the 
Constitution’s content;213 although the nation has sometimes informally 
amended the Constitution by means other than those specified in Article 
V, we cannot articulate any clear rules of recognition that would enable 
citizens and judges to know precisely when such amendments have 
occurred and what those amendments demand;214 and the notion of a 
transtemporal national self that permits one generation of Americans to 
bind another is a myth that one may reasonably reject.215 
Because judges’ interpretive methods frequently create such dead-hand 
concerns, one should ask whether it really is necessary to give judges the 
ultimate authority to interpret the Constitution’s open-ended provisions. At 
the heart of the case for judicial supremacy—and of the case against 
popular constitutionalism—is the belief that, if matters of constitutional 
interpretation were placed in the political domain, political majorities 
would run roughshod over the limits that the Constitution purports to place 
upon them. Assigning the supreme interpretive authority to politically 
insulated courts is necessary, judicial supremacists argue, if we want to 
preserve constitutionalism’s essential distinction between ordinary and 
fundamental law. 
I have identified five reasons to believe that judicial supremacists are 
mistaken. Maintaining faith with the Founders and the Constitution is 
central to Americans’ self-understanding;216 the American people are 
keenly aware of the value of the constitutional regime they have 
inherited;217 the seamlessness of Americans’ generational transitions 
ensures that, at any given moment in time, a variety of temporal 
perspectives are represented, and people holding those differing 
perspectives are likely to seek the common ground provided by the 
American people’s long-term fundamental commitments;218 Americans’ 
desire for politicians who are driven at least partially by principles, rather 
 
 
 211. See supra notes 59–70 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra notes 71–83 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra notes 84–91 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra notes 92–101 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra notes 102–20 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra notes 156–66 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra notes 167–75 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra notes 176–78 and accompanying text. 
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than entirely by polls, demonstrates that Americans know that political 
majorities are sometimes mistaken and that appropriate measures should 
be taken to prevent short-sighted mistakes;219 and the political domain’s 
long-standing experience with “the constitution outside the Constitution,” 
on matters of both institutional structure and individual rights, provides 
good reason to believe that the political domain could responsibly interpret 
the open-ended provisions of the Constitution itself.220 
Finally, it is worth underscoring the difficulties a judicial supremacist 
faces when trying to prove that a political majority’s interpretation of an 
open-ended constitutional provision would obliterate constitutionalism’s 
distinction between ordinary and fundamental law. To gauge an 
interpreter’s fidelity to the Constitution, one must know what the 
Constitution demands. When the Constitution’s text may reasonably be 
interpreted in conflicting ways, however, rigid fidelity determinations 
become nearly impossible to make. The fact that a majority of the 
American people and a majority of the Supreme Court would interpret an 
open-ended text differently is hardly proof that the American people are 
flouting the Constitution’s requirements. So long as the popular majority’s 
interpretation falls within the range of interpretations that an interpreter 
could reasonably assign to the text, one cannot confidently say that the 
popular majority has collapsed constitutionalism’s distinction between 
ordinary politics and fundamental commitments. Absent a genuine risk 
that the American people’s interpretations would be plainly unreasonable, 
an endorsement of the courts’ interpretive supremacy does not seem 
grounded principally in a laudable defense of constitutionalism. Rather, it 
seems grounded in the judicial supremacist’s belief that the courts are 
more likely than the American people to produce outcomes that the 
judicial supremacist personally desires. That is hardly a satisfying 
foundation on which to build a constitutional system. 
 
 
 219. See supra notes 179–93 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra notes 194–209 and accompanying text. 
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